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Pregnancy, a human phenomenon experienced throughout the world and throughout 
history, has been largely ignored by the philosophical community.  A preference for the 
abnormal and the extraordinary has left this common yet challenging process on the 
sidelines of philosophical discussion.  
 
Pregnancy stands as a significant challenge to many of our intuitions about the self, 
particularly those concerning the boundaries, plurality and diachronic identity of the self.  
Because of this, pregnancy necessitates a theory of the self which does not merely uphold 
our usual assumptions about the self. 
 
Daniel Dennett presents a theory of the self which meets this criterion.  He argues that the 
self is a centre of narrative gravity: an abstract, theoretical entity which is useful for the 
explanation and prediction of an individual’s behaviour.  Dennett’s theory, though 
provocative, lacks a basis in typical human experience.  He relies primarily on thought 
experiments and extraordinary conditions to support his theory.  To demonstrate the 
applicability and generality of this theory, it must be tested against a common, natural 
human occurrence like pregnancy. 
 
In this paper we explore the application of Daniel Dennett’s theory of the narrative self to 
the experience of pregnancy.  This application yields a double result.  Dennett’s theory is 
bolstered by a demonstration of its generality and applicability, and the experience of 






Many thanks go to Tim Kenyon for his invaluable encouragement, patience, advice and 
feedback throughout this process.  I would also like to thank Shannon Dea for her very 




















Table of Contents 
 
Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 
Section One: Overview................................................................................................... 1 
Section Two: An Intuitive Understanding of the Self .................................................... 6 
Section Three: Moving Ahead ...................................................................................... 14 
Chapter Two: Dennett’s Theory of the Self ................................................................. 17 
Introduction................................................................................................................... 17 
Section One: Objectivity and Subjective Experience ................................................... 19 
Section Two: Heterophenomenology and the Intentional Stance................................. 26 
Section Three: The Analogy of Fictional Texts............................................................ 30 
Section Four: The Self as a Centre of Narrative Gravity.............................................. 39 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 52 
Implications................................................................................................................... 54 
Chapter Three: Pregnancy and the Self ....................................................................... 56 
Introduction................................................................................................................... 56 
The Pregnant Experience: Beginning ........................................................................... 57 
Section One: Boundaries............................................................................................... 61 
Section Two: Plurality .................................................................................................. 69 
Section Three: Diachronic Identity............................................................................... 76 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 83 
Chapter Four: The Application of Dennett to Pregnancy .......................................... 84 
Introduction................................................................................................................... 84 
Section One: Boundaries............................................................................................... 91 
Section Two: Plurality .................................................................................................. 95 
Section Three: Diachronic Identity............................................................................. 102 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 107 
Chapter Five: Conclusion............................................................................................. 108 
Section One: Where We’ve Been ............................................................................... 108 
Section Two: Where We’re Going ............................................................................. 112 







Chapter One: Introduction 
Section One: Overview 
Context 
In philosophy, we aim for a deeper and clearer understanding of the world.  In 
particular, we often focus on the seemingly familiar and understood areas of human 
experience, and aim to reveal misconceptions and absences in our thinking about them.  
The skin of everyday life is peeled back and underlying assumptions are exposed and 
reexamined.  Things like logic, existence, knowledge, mind, morality and language are 
tested and challenged.  The one thing with which we each seem to be most familiar is our 
selves, and philosophy does not leave this stone unturned.  There is a wide variety of 
philosophical theories of personal identity and selfhood within the contemporary analytic 
tradition.  Many of these theories strive to illuminate the clear or typical cases of selfhood 
by looking at extreme cases in order to emphasize or isolate particular factors.  
Sometimes, too, the strategy is to consider vague borderline cases, in order to show that 
factors that seem unambiguous or discrete in the typical cases are in fact matters of 
degree or of interpretation.  It is these cases that can challenge our intuitions about selves, 
highlighting areas where our idealized assumptions do not apply.   
The particular theory of identity and the self in which I am interested here is 
Daniel Dennett’s theory of the narrative self.  What makes this influential theory 
particularly interesting in this context is its level of tolerance for vague and indeterminate 
cases.  Dennett considers rare conditions as well as theoretical experiments, and accounts 
for them as vague and fuzzy cases without dogmatically ruling them in or out as 




of the analytic tradition in one very important respect, for my purposes:  the cases he 
considers are substantially of the “science fiction” variety, typical of the recent analytic 
literature on selfhood and identity.   
Within the mainstream literature on selfhood, and at the very least, within 
Dennett’s theory of the self, there is a particular glaring absence: pregnancy, perhaps the 
single most common intuition-challenging phenomenon in human experience, is almost 
entirely overlooked. The evidence provided by pregnancy challenges careless 
assumptions about the self as the traditional cases of borderline selfhood do, but 
pregnancy is also a lived experience at the heart of many human lives.  A coherent theory 
of the self, of which Dennett’s seems to be an example, cannot afford to overlook this 
fundamental human experience. 
 
Focus 
It’s terribly difficult not to think about babies…when you’re trying to 
have a conversation about something else and you get a kick.  I mean 
if anybody kicks you it makes you lose your concentration, doesn’t it? 
The fact that the kicking’s going on inside doesn’t really make that 
much difference. (Oakley, 1979, 56) 
 
Is this how it will be: me, pulled apart, existing on at least two 
opposing levels at the same time?…Am I permanently split apart? Me 
in one room?  You in another?  No longer One? (Chesler, 1979, 133) 
 
This ostensibly transformed person of the near future might indeed be 
kinder and more patient than my prematernal self, with whom I was at 
least familiar, shortcomings and all.  But that maternal “I” did not exist 
yet.  I did not yet know if I could successfully transform my current 
self into her – let alone, given how fatuous descriptions of motherly 






These three excerpts illustrate the three questions that we will focus on as we consider 
both the experience of pregnancy and the theory of the self presented by Dennett.  First, 
inside versus outside: what are the boundaries of the self?   Second, one or two: can the 
self be plural?  Lastly, before and after: can an individual change from one self to another 
over time?  It is through these three questions that we will see how the application of 
Dennett’s theory of the self to the experience of pregnancy demonstrates the generality 
and applicability of Dennett’s theory, and locates women’s experiences of pregnancy 
within a theory that accounts for them. 
 
Why Pair Dennett and Pregnancy? 
The ability of a philosophical theory to connect with ordinary experience 
contributes significantly to its acceptance.  Dennett’s preference for ordinary language 
rather than the vocabulary traditionally adopted by philosophers (Dennett, 1993) 
indicates an awareness of this fact, and makes his theory more accessible.  Although the 
concepts he is using are unusual and even counter-intuitive, his avoidance of what he sees 
as problematic terminology makes his theory approachable and connects it with everyday 
life.  This approach does not continue, however, into Dennett’s illustrations. This is the 
first of two problems that motivates the need for the application of Dennett’s theory to 
the pregnant experience.  He does at times appeal to common experiences, perhaps 
talking about my neighbour the “motorist”, who prefers to be a car rather than a human 
being, or that comment I made yesterday that “wasn’t the real me talking” (1991, 417).  
The foundational examples he uses to illustrate his claims, however, are far from typical 




Multiple Personality Disorder (1981, 479-481; 1986, 111; 1991, 419), Fractional 
Personality Disorder (1991, 422), Split-brain surgery (1981, 481; 1991, 423-426), brains 
without bodies, and bodies without brains (1981, 217-229).  I will not deny that these 
types of characters, both real and imaginary, play an important and legitimate role in the 
landscape of philosophical exploration, cautioning us against hasty, unexamined 
generalizations.  However, they lack characteristics that are easy to identify with; while 
you will find yourself remarking about the peculiarity and indeed undeniable curiosity of 
Dennett’s examples, you won’t often find yourself noticing how these things are just like 
the things that happen to you or the people you know.  They are examples that, for the 
most part, remain in a category separate from our ordinary experience.  Furthermore, they 
carry a specific danger with them, which we will see when we consider a few examples 
of well-known thought-experiments on selves and identity throughout the following 
chapters.  Their greatest attraction, the freedom to idealize situations in the pursuit of 
clarity, can be a seriously misleading flaw, leading us to idealize away the very factors 
that matter most to a topic. 
The second problem that prompts my application of Dennett’s theory to 
pregnancy is the challenge that what I term “pregnant experience” presents to our usual 
intuitions about the self.  Through a close look at the research of several thinkers who 
have been dedicated to the investigation of their own and other women’s experiences of 
pregnancy, it becomes clear that pregnancy breaks many of the rules that usually remain 
unchallenged in the context of our daily lives.  As we will see in Chapter Three, our usual 
assumptions about the boundaries, plurality and diachronic identity cannot stand up to a 




account for these experiences is required.  Our traditional ideas about the self will not 
suffice. 
As we will see, there is one solution for both of these problems.  When we apply 
Dennett’s theory of the self to the pregnant experience, Dennett’s theory is substantiated 





Section Two: An Intuitive Understanding of the Self 
There is no generally accepted set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
selfhood in the philosophical literature, and I will not attempt to establish such 
conditions.  Instead I will work with a looser set of hallmarks that are at least intuitively 
indicative of selfhood.  For example, selves have a point of view.  Selves are 
autonomous.  We typically consider selves to be embodied, though of course people may 
disagree as to whether embodiment is a necessary or a contingent characteristic of selves.  
Selves are usually thought to be rational, in at least the basic sense that they are thinking 
beings.  Lastly, and more controversially, each self belongs to one body for life (“belongs 
to” being neutral between many possible complex relationships that might hold between 
selves and bodies
1
).  These are some of the identifying characteristics of selfhood that 
most of us accept as intuitive, and do not have much reason to seriously question in the 
context of our day-to-day lives.   
 
Challenging Intuition: Pregnancy 
Suppose then, that we work with a notion of selves as perspective-holders, 
autonomous, embodied, and rational in some degree. These normal characteristics of 
selves do not, however, determine other facts that we might seek to clarify about them: 
for example, boundaries, plurality, or diachronic identity.  It is these concepts in 
particular which the experience of pregnancy brings to the forefront and for which 
pregnancy provides a particularly pointed challenge.  First, we might generally assume 
that, as an embodied entity, the boundary of the self is simply the boundary of the body – 
                                                 
1
 Are the self and the body the same?  Does the self live inside the body?  Again, these questions will not 




the skin, in effect.  Whether we believe the self to be the body itself or some other type of 
entity merely housed within the body, we generally accept that the self does not go 
beyond or shrink within the boundaries of the body.  Pregnancy challenges this 
assumption.  Second, we tend to assume that there is only ever one self associated with 
each body.  No more, no less.  Pregnancy gives us empirical grounds, and not merely 
thought-experimental grounds, to question this as well. Finally, we assume that the same 
self will remain associated with each body throughout the lifetime of the individual.  
Again, pregnancy provides evidence that prompts us to doubt this assumption.  As we 
will see, pregnancy drives us to reconsider at least a few of the ideas we hold about the 
self. 
 
Challenging Intuition: Others 
Challenges to some of these assumptions, and exceptions to some of these 
characterizations, have been raised in the literature from other perspectives.  I will briefly 
summarize a few of these challenges in order to help situate the current project in the 
philosophical landscape.   
 
Chalmers and Clark: Extending the Self 
The idea that the psychological person is not coextensive with the human body is 
not unique to Dennett.  One interesting hypothesis denying the skin-as-boundary intuition 
can be found in the work of Chalmers’ and Clark’s “The Extended Mind” (1998).  While 
their work mostly fits in the literature on mind and cognition rather than that on selfhood 




self lies at the skin.  Their primary claim is that our definition of the mind should be 
expanded to include the “external” tools (that is, outside of the skull/skin) that we use for 
cognitive processing.  Chalmers and Clark argue that the internal cognitive mechanisms 
that we employ and intuitively consider a part of the mind are no more integral than the 
external physical tools we use.  My cell phone, for example, assuming it is always 
available and reliable, is no less a part of my mind than my memory.  If I want to make a 
phone call, and access my cell phone, instead of my memory, to find the number, the cell 
phone is functioning as a part of the cognitive process that takes place.  Since I do the 
very same thing with my cell phone to access a phone number as I would do with my 
memory, Chalmers and Clark claim that my cell phone is a part of my cognitive 
processing system, and thus a part of my mind. 
As their analysis comes to a close, Chalmers and Clark move beyond the mind to 
consider the self.  Referring to their example of Otto, a man with Alzheimer’s who 
carries a notebook with him to keep track of information, they wonder: 
Does the extended mind imply an extended self? It seems so…The 
information in Otto's notebook, for example, is a central part of his 
identity as a cognitive agent. What this comes to is that Otto himself is 
best regarded as an extended system, a coupling of biological organism 
and external resources. To consistently resist this conclusion, we would 
have to shrink the self into a mere bundle of occurrent states, severely 
threatening its deep psychological continuity. Far better to take the 
broader view, and see agents themselves as spread into the world. 
(Chalmers and Clark, 1998) 
 
Here we see that Chalmers and Clark have denied our usual assumption that the boundary 
of the self lies at the skin, questioning the line between self and other.  The extended 




self can be made up of both biological and human-made components, extending its 
boundaries to include artifacts outside the body.    
This hypothesis certainly gives us reason to question our usual assumptions about 
selves.  Chalmers and Clark challenge us by questioning the exclusion of certain artifacts 
from our understanding of the mind, and thus the self.   Dennett’s theory of the narrative 
self and the pregnant experience also push us to reconsider the distinction between self 
and other.  In “The Reality of Selves” (1991), Dennett discusses the behaviour of certain 
animals that include outside artifacts within their “biological self” – the beaver has a 
dam, the spider a web, and the bower-bird a nest full of found objects (1991, 415).  
Unlike Chalmers and Clark, who draw upon technological extensions of cognitive 
processes to make their point, Dennett focuses on the genetic and developmental aspect, 
appealing to the idea of an “extended phenotype” to explain why we should regard 
external objects or tools (like clothes) as blurring the physical boundaries of the self.  I 
hold that in pregnancy too a blurring of internal and external boundaries presents a 
challenge. The challenge, however, is an entirely natural other: the fetus.
2
  Here we do 
not go so far as to include found artifacts, but rather another separate, though not 
independent member of the species.  Its location within the body of the pregnant woman 
gives us good reason to include it as a part of the self of the woman, while some women’s 
perceptions of it as other force us to reconsider this inclusion.  Within Dennett’s theory, 
as well as within the pregnant experience, the boundaries between self and other are 
challenged, as they are with Chalmers and Clark’s extended mind hypothesis.  In this 
                                                 
2
 Throughout this paper, “fetus” will be used as a general term denoting an unborn human being.  While a 
finer-grained terminology could be used, for my purposes the developmental stage of the pregnancy is not 




context, however, we will not go so far as to extend the boundaries of the self into the 
non-biological world. 
 
Strauss: the Body as Other  
Erwin Strauss is another thinker who challenges our intuitive assumptions about 
the self, particularly its boundaries.  In his book The Primary World of the Senses (1963), 
he argues that 
There can be no self as such or world as such with fixed borderlines 
between them delimiting the within and the without.  The borderline 
does not hue precisely to the surface of the organism’s body as that 
which separates that body from its environment. (244-245) 
 
He claims that the boundary between self and other can change, depending on the 
condition of our body and our connection to it.  Just as Dennett identifies times when I 
may feel that a part of my body is not a part of “me”, for example when my arm falls 
asleep (1991, 108), Strauss agrees, making similar claims about the body as a whole: 
The bodily interior is experienced as within only under certain 
circumstances, particularly in illness, fatigue, or collapse.  If, suddenly, I 
am no longer indifferent to my body, if I suddenly give my attention to 
its functions and processes, then my body as a whole is objectified, 
becomes to me an Other, a part of the outside world…something 
external, something from which I myself am excluded. (245) 
 
Strauss focuses on the status of the body as either self or other, and concludes that it is 
neither.  “The body is the mediator between the self and the world,” he claims; “it 
belongs fully neither to the ‘inner’, nor to the ‘outer’ (245)”. 
The pregnant experience points to a similar conclusion, forcing us to reconsider 
the boundaries between self and other.  As a woman experiences the sometimes extreme 




her body, finding her body to be unfamiliar and separate from what she considers to be 
her self.  These physical changes may result in the identification of a new self, a pregnant 
self, as distinct from the pre- or non-pregnant self.  While Strauss focuses on the nature of 
the body, in our consideration of the pregnant experience we will focus on the self, and 
consider a few of the effects that the pregnant body can have on our understanding of it. 
 
Parfit: Diachronic Identity 
Derek Parfit’s view on personal identity is one which directly challenges our 
assumption that one maintains the same self throughout one’s life.  Through a variety of 
thought experiments, Parfit constructs a theory in which the same body at an earlier and a 
later time need not be connected to the same self.  Although the two selves may share 
memories and personality traits, there is no deeper person which they both are (1971, 25).  
The relations between what he calls earlier and later selves come in degrees, rather than 
being all or nothing (1971, 22).   
Like Dennett, Parfit allows for indeterminacy and unanswerable questions within 
his theory.  Not every describable case of personal identity must provide an answer to the 
question “Are these the same person?” (Parfit, 1971, 8).  In his exploration of the fission 
and fusion of persons, gradual replacement of the matter in one's brain, and other 
interesting thought experimental cases, Parfit demonstrates that seemingly clear concepts 
of person and self break down when we consider these types of atypical cases. 
 




One final opponent to our intuitive definition of the self is Eva Kittay.  In her 
paper “At the Margins of Moral Personhood” (2005), Kittay swims “against the 
philosophical tide” by arguing “against the view that intrinsic psychological capacities 
such as rationality and autonomy…are the principal qualifications” for personhood (100).  
She claims that “the traditional requirements for personhood…are not properties that 
humans maintain throughout life”, and in fact, are properties that some human beings are 
born without (102).  Kittay argues that relational capacities, not psychological capacities, 
are central to personhood (110).  These capacities play a critical role in our moral lives: 
…giving care, responding appropriately to care, empathy, and fellow 
feeling; a sense of what is harmonious and loving; and a capacity for 
kindness and an appreciation for those who are kind. (122) 
   
Kittay also claims that family membership has the moral significance needed to justify 
privileged moral status, particularly being deemed a person (124). 
“Person” and “self” do not share the same meaning although their characteristics 
are similar, and they seem to refer to the same group of individuals.  It seems reasonable 
to conclude however, that while all selves may not be persons, all persons are indeed 
selves.  Thus, Kittay’s arguments against the inclusion of rationality and autonomy in a 
definition of personhood would also apply to our attempts to define selfhood.  She too 
challenges our ordinary intuitive assumptions about selves claiming that rationality and 
autonomy are not necessary for selfhood.   
 
Kittay on Thought Experiments 
In her consideration of personhood, Kittay bases her arguments on her research 




CSMR: those who are congenitally severely mentally retarded.  In our consideration of 
pregnancy, we will use the evidence provided by the experiences of pregnancy as a basis 
for questioning traditional assumptions about the self.  Real life experience, Kittay 
claims, provides us with more reliable intuitions than the hypothetical cases usually 
employed by philosophers.  “Our intuitions are unreliable when we consider cases we 
have never encountered or which our imaginations grasp only haltingly” she states (2005, 
108). The CSMR “are useful, first to test intuitions concerning when a human life is the 
life of a person and, second, to offer a challenge for a moral theory to meet” (2005, 108).  
The same is true of pregnancy.  As we will see, pregnancy is useful to for testing our 
intuitions about selves, and also presents a challenge to theories of self.  As Kittay argues, 
I also argue: these real life situations are useful and consideration of them is necessary for 





Section Three: Moving Ahead 
Through our consideration of these various thinkers and their criticisms of our 
loose set of hallmarks of selfhood, we have seen that point of view, rationality, autonomy 
and embodiment do not stand unchallenged in that role.  While the characteristics that I 
have identified here seem uncontroversial in the context of our usual experiences, as we 
can see there are reasons to think that they begin to break down when we consider certain 
thought experiments, and real life situations.  Dennett, like most philosophers, uses 
hypothetical and extraordinary examples to shake our assumptions and bring to light 
alternative ways of thinking.  A thorough consideration of the pregnant experience 
reveals that it serves the same function, effectively providing a significant challenge to at 
least a few of our assumptions about the self, but without venturing into the realm of the 
unreal or atypical.  For these reasons, the application of Dennett’s theory to the pregnant 
experience serves a double purpose: first, the pregnant experience serves to highlight the 
generality and applicability of Dennett’s theory, and second, Dennett’s theory validates 
and contextualizes women’s experiences of pregnancy, helping to understand and explain 
them in terms of a theory of the self.   
 
Anecdotal Evidence and Heterophenomenology 
Before we begin our exploration of Dennett’s theory of the self, I wish to consider 
the nature of the work that has been done in the area of pregnancy and the self.  As we 
will see in Chapter Three, outside of the abortion discussion, there are a handful of 
thinkers who have chosen to delve into this area of human experience.  These women 




and telling their own.  Much of the available evidence is purely anecdotal and presented 
from a non-philosophical perspective.  While this is an unfortunate consequence of the 
general lack of research done in this area, the collected stories of hundreds of pregnant 
women provide a significant set of data, which must be accounted for in a coherent 
theory of the self.  For an experience so common and so rich to have been ignored is 
regrettable.   
When we consider Dennett’s methodology for understanding the self and 
subjective experience in general, we realize that this sort of anecdotal evidence is 
perfectly suited to his methodology.  As we will see, Dennett’s method of 
heterophenomenology obliges us to begin our efforts to understand the phenomenological 
world of the subject by transcribing her recorded verbal behaviour.  We are then able to 
interpret the written texts as speech acts and consider the subject an “intentional system”.  
To that intentional system we attribute intentional predicates such as beliefs, desires and 
goals as we begin to understand her phenomenological world.  Dennett emphasizes that 
in coming this far, from verbal behaviour to interpreted written text and a rational agent, 
we have not abandoned the objectivity of science.   
In taking this approach, we begin to validate the research and evidence that does 
exist in the area of pregnancy and the self.  The women who have written about the 
phenomenology of pregnancy have chosen primarily to record their own and others’ 
descriptions of what it’s like to be pregnant, in many cases not moving far beyond the 
transcription of verbal behaviour.  Although this may have initially seemed like a 
drawback, according to Dennett, this is the best way for a heterophenomenologist to 




way, and to a greater extent as we continue, we see how productive and beneficial the 
application of Dennett’s theory to the pregnant experience can be.   
 
Structure 
This paper will progress according to the following structure.  We will begin in 
Chapter Two with a discussion of Dennett’s theory of the self.  In sections One, Two, and 
Three, we will familiarize ourselves with his presentation of heterophenomenology, the 
intentional stance, and his analogy with interpreting fictional texts.  Finally, in Section 
Four, we will consider the self as a centre of narrative gravity and the challenges that this 
presents to our intuitive assumptions about the self.  Chapter Three will uncover how the 
pregnant experience challenges our usual intuitions about the self through a discussion of 
the boundaries, plurality and diachronic identity of the self.  Chapter Four will then 
explore the application of Dennett’s theory to the pregnant experience, arguing that this 
application is beneficial to both.  Finally, in Chapter Five we will review what we have 




Chapter Two: Dennett’s Theory of the Self 
Introduction 
In order to properly apply Dennett’s theory of the narrative self to the pregnant 
experience, we must first put a considerable effort into reviewing and understanding his 
theory itself.  This presentation is relatively long, in part because Dennett’s view is a bit 
too counterintuitive to present without its background motivations, and in part because I 
aim to synthesize a few different treatments of the issues that Dennett has given, since 
some of them relate more explicitly to pregnancy than does the most thorough and 
detailed account given in Consciousness Explained.  We will begin in Section One by 
understanding why Dennett’s theory is necessary – attaining an objective understanding 
of subjective experiences is a problem hitherto unsolved by science.  In Section Two we 
will present Dennett’s solution to this problem: heterophenomenology and the intentional 
stance.  Through these methods, we are able to take a subject’s verbal description of her 
phenomenological world and interpret it objectively as the speech acts of a rational agent 
without going outside the boundaries of science.  It is from this groundwork that we will 
begin to move upwards towards the self.  In Section Three, we will move from Dennett’s 
intentional systems to the full-fledged selves that we encounter in daily life by looking at 
Dennett’s comparison between interpreting the verbal behaviour of a subject and 
interpreting a fictional text.  In Section Four we complete this transition and come to the 
summation of Dennett’s theory of the self.  Dennett presents the self as a centre of 
narrative gravity – an abstract fictional entity, useful for explaining and predicting the 




our idealized assumptions about the selves, and we will explore a few of those challenges 





Section One: Objectivity and Subjective Experience 
The Value of Dennett’s Theory 
Contemporary Western culture aims to expand the reach of science to include as 
much of the natural world as possible.  More and more of our environment and 
experience has been scientifically illuminated, settling mysteries and revealing secrets 
that had been previously explained by folklore and superstition.  Dennett points out that 
although science has explained “many initially mysterious natural phenomena – 
magnetism, or photosynthesis, digestion, even reproduction,” it has not been able to reach 
inside the subjective human experience.  He explains: 
Consciousness seems utterly unlike these.  For one thing, particular 
cases of [these other natural phenomena] are in principle equally 
accessible to any observer with the right apparatus, but any particular 
case of consciousness seems to have a favored or privileged observer, 
whose access to the phenomenon is entirely unlike, and better than, the 
access of any others – no matter what apparatus they may have.
3
  (1981, 
8) 
 
It seems that subjective experience has yet to give in to the probing fingers of scientific 
exploration and we have not yet found an objective way to understand the self.  The 
experiencer is the only one who has access to the phenomenology of, or “what it’s like” 
to be, her.   
In the following sections we will explore what it’s like to be a bat, what it’s like to 
be a human being, and the trap of our own perspective.  It will become clear that science 
has not yet achieved an objective understanding of the self. 
   
                                                 
3
 Dennett mentions reproduction as one of the mysteries that science has solved, but does not explore it any 
more than this.  It is interesting to note that in pregnancy there is also a “privileged observer whose access 





We include a discussion of consciousness here as a part of our exploration of 
Dennett’s theory of selfhood because it plays an important role in understanding the 
context of Dennett’s theory.  In Consciousness Explained, Dennett focuses on his theory 
of consciousness and adds his discussion of selfhood on at the end.  Dennett’s 
presentation of the two theories together in this way makes sense considering the 
relationship between the two.  In Dennett’s depiction of consciousness he aims to dispel 
the notion that it is an objectively unknowable mystery, and presents it as something that 
can be documented and interpreted scientifically – that is, by Dennett’s lights, in a way 
amenable to intersubjective analysis.  In his presentation of selfhood, he takes the same 
line.  He views the self not as a material entity, nor as an immaterial soul housed within 
the body, but rather as a practical abstract entity which results from the human system as 
a whole.  Our discussion of the problem of “what it’s like” is presented here for the 
purpose of properly situating Dennett’s project in order to recognize the motivations of 
his theories – first of consciousness, then of selves. 
 
What is it Like to be a Bat? 
In his paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974) Thomas Nagel investigates the 
phenomenology of a bat.  He explains that an outside observer cannot adequately 
understand even the familiar senses that bats share with humans, such as taste, smell and 
touch.  Nagel claims that though they seem familiar, “these experiences also have in each 
case a specific subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive (1974, 




and thus inaccessible to us.  While I could imagine what it would be like for me to be a 
bat, that imagined experience would still fail to map directly onto the experience of the 
bat itself.  A reliable description of what it is like to be a bat seems to be available only 
from the bat’s perspective, and can’t be attained through physical, (or even imaginative) 
scientific examination.  As Nagel states, “if the facts of experience – facts about what it is 
like for the experiencing organism – are accessible only from one point of view, then it is 
a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical 
operation of that organism (1974, 442)”.  Physical examination cannot give us an 
objective understanding of “what it’s like” to be a bat. 
 
What is it Like to be a Human Being? 
Though the experiences of a bat seem to be completely inaccessible using the 
tools of physical science, and even the tools of imagination, we might expect to be more 
successful in the case of other human beings.  It seems, however, that even other human 
beings’ experiences are not available for analysis through scientific methods.  Though we 
may assume that the experiences of others are basically like our own, when we look for a 
scientific understanding of them this assumption breaks down.  In science, we aim to give 
an objective description of the subject we are studying, and thus, in this case, we are 
aiming to discover the objective nature of subjective experience.  We are looking for the 
facts about an individual’s subjective experience.  Nagel states his foundational concern 
about this type of investigation: 
Very little work has been done on the basic question…[of] whether any 
sense can be made of experiences having an objective character at all.  
Does it make sense, in other words, to ask what my experience are really 




understand the hypothesis that their nature is captured in a physical 
description unless we understand the more fundamental idea that they 
have an objective nature. (1974, 448)  
  
Nagel is questioning the very sense of asking for an objective description of subjective 
experience.  As Dennett points out, Nagel “fears that this notion of ‘having experience’ is 
beyond the realm of the objective (1981, 409)”.   
We are moved to ask, in response to this concern, “what is genuine knowledge of 
what it is like to be X?” (Dennett, 1981, 413)  Putting the subjective experiences of bats 
aside, what we are much more interested in is what it is like to be a human being – 
someone growing up in South Africa, or British Columbia, or even just across the street.  
This is a question to which we do not seem to have an answer.  For Dennett though, the 
difficulty continues inward – we can’t stop at our own front door.  We must realize that 
our knowledge, while it clearly fails to extend to the experiences of other species, 
someone across the globe, and perhaps even to someone in the house next door, also fails 
to reach into our own lives.  “We don’t even quite know what it was like to be ourselves 
ten years ago,” Dennett claims.  “Worse yet, we often don’t even know how we could 
possibly have done what we did yesterday (1981, 413)”. Finally, Dennett moves the 
unknown right into our immediate experience.  “When you come right down to it,” he 




Trapped Inside Our Own Perspective 
                                                 
4
 In these passages we can already see one key aspect of Dennett’s complete theory of the self: 
consciousness is not as mysterious as one might think. This is not  because objective description is easy, 
but rather because there is no sharp delineation between the first-person and third-person perspectives.  
Describing what it feels like to be a self is difficult in general; it’s not impossible when it comes to 




One apparent result of the “what’s it like” problem is that attaining a scientific 
understanding of subjective experience in general is a hopeless pursuit.  As an individual 
who can see only from my own perspective, it is impossible to get an objective grasp on 
my experiences.  Dennett explains that “we can come close to seeing and understanding 
ourselves objectively, but each of us is trapped inside a powerful system with a unique 
point of view (1981, 278)”.  Objectivity, achieved (if it can be achieved) by giving a 
description that is true from any perspective, can only be approximated if a subject is 
willing to defer occasionally to evidence that can be evaluated publicly, even if this 
clashes with her powerful intuitions and judgments about her own experience. 
Raymond Smullyan highlights this challenge in his paper “An Epistemological 
Nightmare” (1982).  He tells the story of a man who has invented a mind-reading 
machine that can tell what’s “really” going on inside your head.  Regardless of what you 
think you desire, plan, like, or even think, the machine has the ultimate authority and final 
answer about the facts of these matters.  In Dennett’s analysis of this thought experiment, 
he explains that for using this machine to confirm the authority you have about what’s 
really going on in your head,  
[T]he price you pay…is the outside chance of being discredited.  ‘I 
know what I like,’ we are all prepared to insist, ‘and I know what it’s 
like to be me!’  Probably you do, at least about some matters, but that is 
something to be checked in performance.  Maybe, just maybe, you’ll 
discover that you really don’t know as much as you thought you did 
about what it is like to be you. (Dennett, 1981, 429) 
 
While there can be no doubt that I have unique access to an understanding of what it is 
like to be me, there is the chance that I could be wrong even about that.  This possibility 
is something we encounter on a regular basis, although we usually play the role of seeing 




and says, “Oh, he likes her – he just doesn’t know it yet!” A mother comments on how 
her teenage daughter is really a “people-pleaser,” even though her daughter says she 
doesn’t care what people think.  In these cases it’s not that we believe that the subject is 
trying to deceive us, but only that we know something that they, sincerely, do not. 
A more extreme and unusual case of this can be seen in split-brain patients.  The 
work of Michael Gazzinga explores this phenomenon (2008) and Dennett considers it 
quite extensively in “The Reality of Selves” (1991).  After surgery severing the nerve 
fibers that connect the two sides of a subject’s brain, his or her behaviour is slightly 
altered.  For example, Zachary is shown an apple on the left side of a screen.  When he is 
asked what he saw, he says he saw nothing.  However, when he is asked to use his left 
hand to select an object from a box without looking, he chooses an apple.  If Zachary 
does not look at the object he has chosen, he will still state that he does not know what it 
is.  If he is allowed to see the object, and is asked why he chose the apple, he will 
fabricate an explanation for his behaviour, stating that he was hungry, for example.  Here, 
although the experimenter knows that Zachary chose the apple because it was what was 
shown on the screen, Zachary is unaware of what is “really” going on inside his brain.  
This gives us a clear picture of the possibility of being wrong, not only about what it’s 
like to be a bat, or someone living on another continent, but also about our own 
subjective experience.  We need to note not only that Zachary, or any of us for that 
matter, can make mistakes, but also how quickly, how plausibly, and (from the first-
person perspective) how invisibly Zachary and the rest of us can invent a false story about 
how things really were – a story that presents itself to us not as a best-guess, but as self-




As we continue into Section Two, we will explore Dennett’s response to the 
problem of objectively understanding subjective experience.  Through 
heterophenomenology and the intentional stance, Dennett takes us from the recorded 
verbal behaviour of a subject to an interpretation of the subject as a rational agent while 





Section Two: Heterophenomenology and the Intentional Stance 
To solve the problem of scientifically understanding subjective experience, 
Dennett introduces two related technical notions: heterophenomenology and the 
intentional stance.  These approaches give us methods for recording, interpreting and 
understanding individuals’ subjective experiences, including our own, without having to 
regard those experiences as metaphysically mysterious or epistemically of an entirely 
different order than the rest of our knowledge of the world.   
Dennett explains that heterophenomenology  
[I]s the neutral path leading from objective physical science and its 
insistence on the third person point of view, to a method of 
phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most 
private and ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the 
methodological scruples of science. (Dennett, 1991, 72) 
 
Although subjective experience seems to be inescapably bound to the first person 
perspective, Dennett claims that we can escape from that perspective to an objective third 
person point of view.   
Heterophenomenology is, at first glance, a simple methodology for understanding 
the subjective experiences of a human subject.  What Dennett does, however, is pull apart 
our assumptions and uncover what lies behind the interpretation and analysis that comes 
naturally in our everyday lives. 
In an effort to make sense of the subjective experiences of a particular human 
subject, we might begin by creating audio recordings of his verbal descriptions of them.  
We then transcribe the recordings into written form.  Finally, we interpret the text.  
Rather than viewing the text as a series of marks and symbols, we would interpret the text 




meaningless sounds, but instead, things like questions, statements, requests and 
comments.  While this seems like an obvious and natural step to take, Dennett explains 
that  
This sort of interpretation calls for us to adopt what I call the intentional 
stance: we must treat the noise-emitter as an agent, indeed a rational 
agent, who harbors beliefs and desires and other mental states that 
exhibit intentionality or “aboutness,” and whose actions can be 
explained (or predicted) on the basis of the content of these states. 
(1991, 76) 
 
We do this kind of thing all the time.  When we have an ordinary conversation 
with a colleague, we interpret her behaviour as the actions of a rational agent, not just as 
random noise.  In doing this, we have adopted the intentional stance towards her. 
We take the intentional stance when the behaviour of a system can be explained 
or predicted by attributing to it goals, beliefs, desires, and other intentional attributes 
(Dennett, 1978, 3).  “A particular thing is an intentional system only in relation to the 
strategies of someone who is trying to explain and predict its behaviour (Dennett, 1978, 
3-4)”.  The decision to treat something as an intentional system “is not intrinsically right 
or wrong” and says nothing very specific about the physical properties or characteristics 
of the system, but just that it is useful to explain and predict its behaviour this way 
(Dennett, 1978, 7).  To take the intentional stance towards a microwave is not useful at 
all; there is no benefit to be had from interpreting it as having beliefs or desires or goals, 
although we might sometimes say it wanted to make my food extra hot.  It might be more 
useful to attribute intentional attributes to, for example, a pet.  When Laura sees her cat 
scratching and meowing at the door, she might say that Earl wants to go outside because 




attributing desires and beliefs to him, which could be useful to her if it helps her 
understand and predict Earl’s behaviour. 
Deciding to take the intentional stance does not mean it is the only way to explain 
and predict the subject’s behaviour – it just means that it’s one way that is successful 
(Dennett, 1978, 271).  There are other stances we can take, which are useful for other 
things (1978, 4).  The design stance is useful for mechanical objects.  We adopt this 
stance when we predict or explain a thing’s behaviour according to how it was designed - 
what it was made to do.  Why did the patio light turn on as I walked by?  I could take the 
intentional stance and conclude that it knew I was there and wanted to light my path.  But 
a more useful and predictive approach would be the design stance:  it turned on because 
that’s what motion-sensing lights are designed to do.   The physical stance is particularly 
useful for predicting the malfunctioning of things, and approaches a system as a purely 
mechanical object.  We can predict and explain the behaviour of a falling wine glass 
based purely on its physical make-up and our knowledge of physical laws.  We know it 
will shatter not because it wanted to stain the floor and not because it was designed to 
break easily, but rather because we know that glass is fragile and that gravity won’t let 
up.  A particular stance is chosen on the basis of its effectiveness in explaining and 
predicting, not on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of the system.  The intentional 
stance is taken, “not because [the system] really and truly has beliefs and desires 
(whatever that would be), but just because it succumbs to a certain stance adopted toward 






In Section One it became clear that there has been no method with which to 
understand subjective experience from an objective standpoint.  It seems impossible to 
move beyond the first person perspective since we are each trapped inside our own point 
of view – I have privileged access to “what it’s like” to be me.  As Nagel expresses it, 
there is serious doubt as to whether it even makes sense to try and talk about subjective 
experiences in an objective way.  Dennett however, gives us two important approaches 
that allow us to do this.  Through heterophenomenology and the intentional stance, we 
are able to take a subject’s verbal description of her phenomenological world and 
interpret it objectively as the speech acts of a rational agent without going outside the 
boundaries of science. 
  It is from this groundwork that we now begin to move upwards towards the self.  
While we can agree that it makes sense to view ourselves and other human beings as 
rational agents who have such intentional states as beliefs, desires, and goals, in our daily 
interactions we see complexity and messiness that is not fully articulated in this 
conception of the self.  We need to move to a deeper understanding of Dennett’s 




Section Three: The Analogy of Fictional Texts 
One way to begin to flesh out the objective interpretation of a subject is through 
Dennett’s analogy with fiction.  He compares interpreting our and others’ behaviour to 
interpreting a fictional text.  Through this comparison we begin to see the complexities of 
the rational agents of the intentional stance.  As we consider the discord that exists 
between how things seem and how things are, and the indeterminacy and reviseability of 
facts in the phenomenological world, this complexity becomes evident. 
Through the heterophenomenological method we can take the verbal accounts of 
the subject, and create a written text that is open to interpretation by taking the intentional 
stance.  The interpretation of this written text, Dennett claims, is much like the 
interpretation of a fictional text.  He explains: 
We can compare the heterophenomenologist’s task of interpreting 
subjects’ behaviour to the reader’s task of interpreting a work of 
fiction…In spite of our knowledge or assumption that the story told is 
not true, we can, and do, speak of what is true in the story…the 
interpretation of fiction is undeniably do-able, with certain 
uncontroversial results…one can learn a great deal about a novel, about 
its text, about the point, about the author, even about the real world, by 
learning about the world portrayed by the novel. (1991, 79) 
 
 
The Story is Not True 
In this passage Dennett makes quite a few claims about fiction, and thus about the 
interpretation of a subject’s behaviour.  His first claim is that we assume the story is not 
true.  In the case of the subject’s text, we don’t assume it to be false because he is 
intentionally lying, but we are aware that the subject may be mistaken about what is 




[A]re sincere (apparently), we grant [that what they describe] must be 
what it is like to them, but then it follows that what it is like to them is a 
best an uncertain guide to what is going on in them. (1991, 94)  
 
The fact that things seem a certain way to the subject does not guarantee that things 
actually are that way.  Through understanding this characteristic of a subject’s 
phenomenological world, we begin to add complexity to our understanding of Dennett’s 
theory of the self. 
 
The Way Things Seem and the Way Things Are 
This discrepancy between the way things seem and the way things are is exactly 
what Dennett is talking about when he refers to “the world portrayed by the novel” in 
contrast to “the real world” (Dennett, 1991, 79).  “Subjects are unwitting creators of 
fiction, but to say that they are unwitting is to grant that what they say is, or can be, an 
account of exactly how it seems to them (Dennett, 1991, 94)”.  The subject’s account of 
how things seem to her is the world portrayed by the text.  According to Dennett, this 
may or may not have any implications for what is going on in “the real world”, that is, 
inside the subject.  For Dennett,  
We are all virtuoso novelists, who find ourselves engaged in all sorts of 
behaviour…We try to make all of our material cohere into a single good 
story.  And that story is our autobiography. (1986, 114) 
   
Like split-brain patients, we each do our best to make sense of the situations in which we 
find ourselves, and the behaviour in which we find ourselves engaging.  “We are all, at 
times, confabulators, telling and retelling ourselves the story of our own lives, with scant 
attention to the question of truth (Dennett, 1986, 111)”.  What is going on in the real 




inconsequential to the shape of the story we tell.  Here Dennett uncovers an ambiguity in 
the notion of subjective experience. There are two types of facts that can be stated about 
an agent’s experience: those facts that are determined by the relationships and causes that 
act on the agent and within the agent to shape her behaviour, and those about how the 
agent subsequently – even in the immediate future, within a second or less – represents 
those internal and external facts in the form of memories or utterances or beliefs about 
what happened and how it seemed.  Because these two types of facts are not the same 
thing, we can meaningfully distinguish between how things really were, subjectively, 
with an agent, which heterophenomenology might aim to discover, and how it seemed to 
the agent that things really were with her, which is far more fallible than we would like to 
believe, and thus only partial evidence in heterophenomenological inquiry.   
This may seem to be an unbelievable and unacceptable claim – that we do not 
have a firm grip on our own experiences.  It seems obvious that we know what’s going on 
in our own heads.  However, as we saw in the case of split-brain patients, this divergence 
between what is and what seems is possible.  If we carefully consider our experiences, we 
can see that this happens not only in unusual cases like split-brain patients, but also in our 
ordinary lives.  For example, in the case of our own physical well being, we seek out 
professional help because we are aware of our own ignorance about what is really going 
on.  When a baseball player standing too close to the on-deck circle gets an aluminum bat 
across the arm, we can see the two different types of facts about his experience.  The 
boy’s interpretation of the situation is that his arm is broken.  Because of the pain he’s 
feeling, it does seem broken to him; this is a fact about his subjective experience.  There 




doesn’t seem broken to him.  The other fact, whether or not his arm is actually broken, is 
determined by the external factors affecting it – the speed of the bat, the strength of his 
bone, and others – and it will be up to the ER doctors to uncover it.   
We may think that these two types of fact don’t apply, however, to things going 
on inside the head.  The boy may not know exactly what's going on inside his arm 
because he is not inside his arm, we might say.  I am inside my head (at least mentally 
and psychologically), and therefore I have a much better idea of what's going on in the 
area of my mental life, than I do about what's going on inside my arm, or any other part 
of my body.  While this may be the case, we do turn to professionals even in when it’s 
psychological causes and effects that are in question.  When things go wrong, we can 
admit that we don’t understand our own experiences, our own phenomenological world.  
Our mental health, like our physical health, can be something about which we are not 
adequately knowledgeable and for which we often seek out help from someone who can 
tell us what’s really going on.     
In short, Dennett argues that our confidence in the correspondence between 
seeming and being, between our phenomenological world and reality, must be reduced. 
Dennett explains it like this: 
If you want us to believe everything you say about your phenomenology, 
you are asking not just to be taken seriously but to be granted papal 
infallibility, and that is asking too much.  You are not authoritative about 
what is happening in you, but only about what seems to be happening in 
you, and we are giving you total, dictatorial authority of the account of 
how it seems to you, about what it is like to be you. (Dennett, 1991, 96) 
 
In order to maintain objectivity in the course of understanding subjective experience, we 
must agree to the fallibility of our own perspective.  If we claim that seeming is being, 




subject says and abandons objectivity.  The fact that we are not authoritative about what 
is happening with us helps us to understand Dennett’s theory of the self and begins to 
move us from the rational agent to the more common complex self. 
 
Indeterminacy 
As we have begun to understand Dennett’s comparison between interpreting the 
text of the subject and interpreting the text of a fictional novel, we have seen that in the 
text – the subject’s description of what it’s like to be her – the subject is describing her 
own phenomenological world.  Dennett distinguishes this world from the real world by 
comparing it to “the world portrayed by the novel”. He highlights the fact that, even 
though we know the novel is not a true story, we still talk about “what is true in the story” 
(Dennett, 1991, 79).  The same applies when interpreting a subject’s description of her 
phenomenological world.  We can, based on the text, decide what is true and what is not 
true in the realm of “what it’s like” for the subject.   
There are, however, areas where questions of fact are neither true nor false – 
where there simply is no fact of the matter.  Again, we consider fictional writing to see 
how this could be the case.  Dennett explains that although what is true in a story may go 
beyond what is simply stated in the text, “beyond the limits of such extrapolation 
fictional worlds are simply indeterminate…There is simply no fact of the matter” (1986, 
105).  Take, for example, the story James and the Giant Peach (1961).  We can ask a few 
different questions about the world created by the text.  If we wonder how James’ parents 
died, we can find the answer explicitly stated in the text: “both of them suddenly got 




text, we might be curious as to whether or not James’ two aunts spoke with a British 
accent.  Although this isn’t explicitly stated in the text, we may justifiably assume that 
they did, since they lived “in the south of England” (Dahl, 1961, 2).  Imagine though, that 
we want to know what kind of a peach the famous giant peach was.  Search though we 
may, to this question, there simply is no answer.  We know that the peach tree from 
which the giant peach grew was an old one, and that the skin of the peach was “a rich 
buttery yellow with patches of brilliant pink and red” (Dahl, 1961, 23), and that it tasted 
delicious.  But as for the variety of peach that James was dealing with, this fact is simply 
indeterminate, since nothing in the text gives us an answer to this question.  Dennett 
gives this example: “with regard to any actual man, living or dead, the question of 
whether or not he has or had a mole on his left shoulder blade has an answer, yes or 
no…But with regard to a fictional character, that question may have no answer at all 
(Dennett, 1986, 106)”. 
On Dennett’s view, the same is true in the phenomenological world of an 
individual.  I may wonder where my grandmother and grandfather first met.  Although I 
don’t know the answer to this question, it is nonetheless an answerable one.  Did my 
grandmother think my grandfather was handsome when they first met?  The answer to 
this question is indeterminate; or, at least, has no more fine-grained answer than the 
discoverable record of when she displayed or recorded some judgment on the matter. 
Having interpreted the text as the speech acts of a rational agent, therefore taking 
the intentional stance, we adopt the view that what the subject says (i.e. the behaviour of 
the intentional system) constitutes his phenomenological world – what it is like to be him 




them; there is nothing to know, as in a fictional text.  This feature of a subject’s 
phenomenology again adds to the complexity of the subject.  Not only are we dealing 
with a rational agent who has desires and goals, but more than that, the agent is an 
individual with some mystery and vagueness.  Dennett’s theory does account for the 
selves we see in our everyday lives. 
 
That’s Not All She Wrote  
Dennett’s comparison between the task of interpreting a fictional text such as 
James and the Giant Peach, and interpreting the text given to us by our subject as a 
description of her phenomenological world, has consisted mostly of similarities.  We 
have already seen that the methodology of heterophenomenology and the intentional 
stance are integral to interpreting our subjective experiences, and now we can see that 
this interpretation is usefully similar to interpreting fiction.   
The last and perhaps most interesting insight to be taken from Dennett’s 
comparison here is a point of contrast.  In a fictional text, once the novel is written and 
published “it is too late for the novelist to render determinate anything indeterminate that 
strikes your curiousity (Dennett, 1986, 109)”.  If you want to know the exact volume of 
the giant peach, it will be impossible for you to find out.  As Roald Dahl is no longer 
around to write a sequel including this information, the exact dimensions of the giant 
peach will forever be indeterminate; there is nothing that can be done to make them 
determinate.   
This is not the case with the text created by the subject.  We can ask her more 




mind that she is only the authority on how things seem to her, we can make determinate 
facts in her phenomenological world that were indeterminate before.  My grandmother 
cannot change the location of their first meeting, but I can simply ask her how she felt 
about my grandfather when they first met, and she can make that indeterminate fact a 
determinate one.  Dennett explains that it is possible 
[T]o engage in auto-hermeneutics, interpretation of one’s self, and in 
particular to go back and think about one’s past, and one’s memories, 
and to rethink them and re-write them.  This process does change the 
“fictional” character, the character that you are. (Dennett, 1986, 110) 
 
One’s description of subjective experience can always be revised. 
 
Review 
With Dennett, we begin by interpreting the verbal behaviour of an individual 
subject and in a sense, understanding her world.  Although the prospect of scientifically 
understanding the subject’s subjective experiences seemed slim at first, through 
Dennett’s heterophenomenological methods and his introduction of the intentional stance, 
science and experience have come together.  We noted however, that what Dennett had 
given through these two theories was merely the interpretation of a subject as a rational 
agent.  Although this is helpful in terms of scientific understanding, it is clear that this 
seems to be a far cry from the complicated individuals that we interact with in our regular 
lives.   
We explored this criticism by taking a look at Dennett’s analogy between 
interpreting the text of the subject and interpreting a fictional text.  Here we could 
identify some key characteristics of the subject’s phenomenology.  First, we noted that 




things seem to him.  This account is not reliable when it comes to understanding how 
things are in the real world.  Second, Dennett points out that there are some questions that 
may not be answerable through interpretation of the subject’s text – they are 
indeterminate.  Lastly, while the indeterminate facts within a fictional text are for the 
most part fixed once the text is published, there is no publishing with the text of the 
subject.  Indeterminate facts about his story can be edited and revised on an ongoing basis 
throughout his life. 
We have slowly been able to build up our understanding of Dennett’s theory, 
moving from the static rational agent that we saw through the intentional stance to a more 
dynamic sort of agent, through the analogy with fictional texts.  As we move into Section 
Four, we will pull these pieces together through Dennett’s theory of the self as a centre of 





Section Four: The Self as a Centre of Narrative Gravity 
In Our Interpretation We Find the Self 
As the complexity of the rational agent becomes more apparent through Dennett’s 
comparison to fictional texts, we begin to see the need for an organizing principle.  As we 
interpret the verbal behaviour of others and of ourselves, we find it useful to organize our 
interpretation around a central idea: a self (Dennett, 1986, 105).  As we interpret the 
verbal behaviour of the subject as speech acts rather than meaningless noise, we posit a 
self from which these speech acts are issued.  Again this seems like an obvious step, and 
is something we do naturally.  Dennett’s understanding of this process, however, is what 
challenges our intuitions: 
The idealization that makes heterophenomenology possible assumes that 
there is someone home doing the talking, an Author of the Record, a 
Meaner of all the meanings.  When we go to interpret a loquacious 
body’s vocal sounds, we don’t suppose that they are just random yawps, 
or words drawn out of a hat by a gaggle of behind-the-scenes partygoers, 
but the acts of a single agent, the (one and only) person whose body is 
making the sounds.  If we choose to interpret at all, we have no choice 
but to posit a person whose communicative acts we are interpreting. 
(Dennett, 1991, 228-229) 
 
We do not interpret the sounds as speech acts because we know there is a “meaner of the 
meanings” inside the body we’re interacting with.  Rather, because we interpret the 
sounds as speech acts, we must posit a self.  The self is a tool, “an abstraction one uses as 
part of a theoretical apparatus to understand, and predict, and make sense of, the 
behaviour of some very complicated things (Dennett, 1986, 114)”, namely human beings.  
We take the interpreted text of the subject as forming a series of narratives about the 
subject, and the self is the center of narrative gravity – the theoretical point around which 





Fiction is Okay 
It may seem strange, and in fact perhaps slightly embarrassing, to see the self as 
an abstract, fictional entity.  We may wonder why a scientist, or the theorist interpreting 
the behaviour of human beings, would want to include in her theory something fictional.  
“Is the suggestion then that I am my body’s dream?” you might ask, “Am I just a 
fictional character in a sort of novel composed by my body in action (Dennett, 1981, 
351)?”   For Dennett, the answer to this question is yes, with a qualification.  You are not 
just a fictional character.  Fictional entities are long-time members of the scientific 
community and have always been treated with respect (Dennett, 1991, 95).  As Dennett 
explains, selves “are not idle fantasies but hardworking theorists’ fictions (Dennett, 1991, 
96)”. 
 
The Multiple Drafts Model 
If the self is to be seen as a center of narrative gravity, we must first discuss the 
narrative itself and its creation.  According to Dennett, each thought or mental activity 
taken on by the subject is accomplished by different parts of the brain, which are 
interpreting sensory inputs all at the same time.  Everything that comes in is continuously 
being interpreted, edited and revised by specialized parts all working together.  Mental 
tasks “are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation 
and elaboration of sensory inputs.  Information entering the nervous system is under 




The contents of these interpretations and revisions are fixed throughout the brain.  
Over time, the accumulation of these “content-discriminations” becomes “something 
rather like a narrative stream or sequence, which can be thought of as subject to continual 
editing by many processes distributed around in the brain, and continuing indefinitely 
into the future (Dennett, 1991, 113)”. The revisions are necessary because the brain has 
to deal not only with incoming data, but also with doubts about and reinterpretations of 
that data (Dennett, 1981, 343).  Dennett explains that “at any point in time there are 
multiple ‘drafts’ of narrative fragments at various stages of editing in various places in 
the brain (1991, 113)”.  When you ask the subject a question (or the world prompts a 
response from the subject in some way) she may give you a different story than she did 
on another occasion, depending on the place or time at which the stream was “probed” 
(Dennett, 1991, 113).  As the subject continues to experience the world, editing of the 
various narratives is ongoing, and can occur in almost any order.  Things can be 
incorporated or overwritten or emended as time goes by (Dennett, 1991, 135). Dennett 
calls this part of his theory the Multiple Drafts Model.  It is through this model that we 
understand the continuous re-creation of the self through the constant editing and revising 
of incoming stimuli by the brain. 
 
Circularity 
Before we go on to discuss further characteristics of the self in Dennett’s theory 
we must pause to make a certain distinction.  We don’t typically think of other people, or 
ourselves, as narratives, and it may seem odd to think that way.  How can I be a story?  




and retelling ourselves the story of our own lives (Dennett, 1986, 111)”, don’t seem to 
line up with our own experiences of ourselves.  How can I be telling the story of my life 
to myself?  It can certainly be confusing and seem circular at times. 
To resolve this, we have to consider the distinction between the narrative itself, 
and the content of the narrative.  For Dennett, a self is a centre of narrative gravity.  It 
might be useful to see one’s life as a collection of narratives, and one’s self as a character 
in the narratives – in fact, the main character – the entity around which everything else 
revolves.  Within these narratives, things like our homes and cars aren’t usually 
considered a part of our selves – neither according to Dennett’s theory nor according to 
our own experiences.  To say that we tell the story of ourselves to ourselves, (as it may 
seem that Dennett is saying) is just to say that our behaviour, our family and friends, our 
bodies and even our stuff, work together to create the story of us. 
 
Challenging Intuitions  
Now that we have a basic understanding of Dennett’s theory of the self, we will 
move on to discuss the specific characteristics of the self that follow from it.  Viewing the 
self as a centre of narrative gravity brings certain assumptions that we usually make about 
the self under scrutiny.  Our intuitions about boundaries of the self, its relationship to the 
body, and its unity are all challenged by Dennett’s theory.   
 
Boundaries 
Despite having clarified the nature of the self as a centre of narrative gravity 




you have something that is trying to preserve itself, and in doing so must distinguish 
between itself and the world, drawing boundaries between the two.  Dennett explains: 
As soon as something gets into the business of self-preservation, 
boundaries become important, for if you are setting out to preserve 
yourself, you don’t want to squander effort trying to preserve the whole 
world: you draw the line.  You become, in a word, selfish… ‘Me against 
the world’ – this distinction between everything on the inside of a closed 
boundary and everything in the external world – is at the heart of all 
biological processes. (1991, 174) 
 
It is the delineation of this closed boundary that presents the difficulty.  Within the 
narrative, it is not clear what counts as a part of the self and what doesn’t – what counts 
as the rest of the world.  There are extremes at both ends of this graduated spectrum, 
which can be quite obviously counted in or out.  I am quite sure that my brain is a part of 
my self, and quite sure that the tree in my front yard is not.  As we move through the 
continuum towards the place where inside and outside meet, we get to the grey area. Is 
my arm a part of my self?  If I were to lose it for some reason would I have lost a part of 
my self or “just” a part of my body?  These questions are not easy. 
It is important to note that the task of drawing this boundary between self and 
other takes place within the narrative.  It is not a question of where the narrative begins 
and ends; it is a question of our instantiated selves within the narrative.  The narrative can 
include it all – everything from my heart to my neighbour’s cat.  The questions come 
when we begin to draw a line between everything else, and us.   
If we accept Dennett’s theory of the self as a centre of narrative gravity, our usual 
answer to the question of boundaries may no longer suffice.  Typically, we view the 
boundaries of the self as the skin.  When something is inside, it’s me, and when it’s 




first step of the experiment is to swallow the saliva in your mouth right now.  The second 
step is to spit into a clean glass and then swallow that.  While the first step isn’t 
objectionable, the second is  
Disgusting!  But why?  It seems to have to do with our perception that 
once something is outside of our bodies it is no longer quite part of us 
anymore – it becomes alien and suspicious – it has renounced its 
citizenship and becomes something to be rejected. (1991, 414)  
 
Indeed, the skin is a widely accepted boundary between the self and the rest of the world. 
According to Dennett however, the self is not merely a physical entity, and thus 
the skin may not be an appropriate place to draw the line between self and other.  
Clothes, Dennett claims, belong on human beings the way feathers belong on a bird, or a 
shell on a turtle.  “An illustrated encyclopaedia of zoology should no more picture Homo 
sapiens naked than it should picture Ursus arctus – the black bear – wearing a clown suit 
and riding a bicycle (Dennett, 1991, 416)”.   
 
Pregnancy 
An important case study within an investigation of the boundaries of the self is the 
area of human reproduction.  By drawing the line at the skin of the pregnant woman, the 
fetus is unaccounted for; because it is inside the skin, it should automatically be 
considered a part of the self.  This is not an automatic conclusion however, and not all 
women see the fetus in this way.  Dennett’s theory of the self, and his understanding of 
these boundaries, is sure to have implications not only for philosophical understanding, 
but also what we take to be an appropriate response to these questions.  It is because of 




deeper into the question of the boundaries of the self, particularly in the case of 
pregnancy, as we continue. 
  
The Body and the Self 
We have referred repeatedly to our usual assumption that the boundaries of the 
self are simply the boundaries of the body: the skin.  To begin to understand the problems 
that exist within this assumption, we must consider the relationship between the body and 
the self.  While the self seems to reside in the body, and the body undeniably plays an 
enormous role in the creation of the center of narrative gravity that is the self (Dennett, 
1991, 452-453), it is not clear that the body simply is the self (Dennett, 1981, 5, 6, 48).  
Dennett illustrates this idea in a few ways.  He says that although our usual 
experiences impress upon us “the distinction between ‘in here’ and ‘out there’”, 
something as simple as having our arm fall asleep begins to erode this impression.   
The naïve boundary between “me” and “the outside world” is my skin 
(and the lenses of my eyes) but, as we learn more and more about the 
way events in our own bodies can be inaccessible “to us”, the great 
outside encroaches.  “In here” I can try to raise my arm, but “out there,” 
if it has “fallen asleep” or is paralyzed, it won’t budge; my lines of 
communication from wherever I am to the neural machinery controlling 
my arm have been tampered with. (1991, 8) 
 
Perhaps the skin is not a reliable line on which to draw this boundary. 
Dennett again illustrates the distinction between a self and a body in an amusing 
thought experiment.  In his fictional story, “Where Am I” (Dennett, 1978), he illuminates 
the idea that our sense of “I” is does not disappear when, for example, our brain and our 




view the self as an organizing principle through which we make sense of our ideas and 
experiences than as something physical. 
In “Where Am I”, Dennett constructs the story of his involvement in a top-secret 
mission.  In order to participate, Dennett is to have his brain removed from his head and 
put into a large vat where it will be safely stored.  By remote radio communication, his 
body (which he later names Hamlet) is to remain connected with his brain (named 
Yorick) and thus still controlled by it.  Dennett is then to perform a highly secretive 
mission involving tunneling to the centre of the earth.   
Dennett agrees to undergo the surgery and perform the mission and in the course 
of the mission, Dennett’s body, Hamlet, is destroyed.  Yorick, his brain, is nevertheless 
safely stored in the vat, and fully functioning.  Yorick is, however, without a body 
through which to interact with the world.  After a painful period of isolation, Yorick is 
connected to a new body (named Fortinbras) and a computer duplicate of Yorick is 
created and also connected to Fortinbras.  Dennett can easily switch back and forth 
between being controlled by Yorick and the computer duplicate of Yorick, Hubert, 
without distinguishable difference.  The master switch between the two is given only to 
Dennett so that no one else can tamper with it.  At the very end of the story, Dennett flips 
the switch to illustrate to his audience the seamlessness of the transition between Yorick 
and Hubert, and it is discovered that the two “brains” had mysteriously gotten out of 
sync, causing a different individual to arise from each.  The story ends here, leaving 





Throughout this thought experiment, Dennett asks many questions himself, the 
most obvious of which is ‘where am I?’  When Dennett’s brainless body is tunneling to 
the center of the earth, and his bodiless brain, which is nonetheless controlling his body, 
is safely in Houston, where is he?  When his body is destroyed and his brain is floating 
without sensation in the vat, where is he?  When Dennett switches between Yorick and 
Hubert, his real and computer duplicate brains, where is he?  In constructing these 
perplexing situations, Dennett’s thought experiment emphasizes our intuition that the self 
is not identical to the body.  “A person is not just a body; a person has a body (Dennett, 
1991, 452-453)”.  It may seem that the self is the brain in Dennett’s story, but his 
experience implies otherwise, since he has real difficulty locating himself in the vat.  This 
amusing internal conversation illustrates this point quite well: 
I thought to myself: ‘Well, here I am, sitting on a folding chair, staring 
though a piece of plate glass at my own brain….But wait,’ I said to 
myself, ‘shouldn’t I have thought “Here I am, suspended in a bubbling 
fluid, being stared at by my own eyes”?’  I tried to think this latter 
thought, I tried to project it into the tank, offering it hopefully to my 
brain, but I failed to carry off the exercise with any conviction…No, it 
just didn’t work…I believed unswervingly that the tokening of my 
thoughts was occurring somewhere in my brain: yet, when I thought 
‘Here I am,’ where the thought occurred to me was here, outside the 
vat, where I, Dennett, was standing staring at my brain. (Dennett, 
1978, 312) 
 
Thus, we begin to question the dependence of our understanding of self on the physical 
constitution of our bodies.  The boundaries of the self are not simply the boundaries of 
the body. 
Two further examples that Dennett uses also imply a distinction between the body 
and the self: Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), and Fractional Personality Disorder 




Customer” (Dennett, 1991, 422) is challenged.  In the case of MPD, “a single human 
body seems to be shared by several selves, each, typically with a proper name and an 
autobiography (Dennett, 1991, 419)”.  FPD presents a challenge in the other direction, 
where two bodies share a single self (Dennett, 1991, 422).  The Chaplin twins of York, 
England seemed to be a case of this extraordinary disorder.   
These identical twins…seem to act as one; they collaborate on the 
speaking of single speech acts…[They are] as inseparable as two twins 
who are not Siamese twins could arrange.  Some who have dealt with 
them suggest that the natural and effective tactic that suggested itself 
was to consider them more of a her (Dennett, 1991, 422)”.   
 
In this bizarre case, the identity of the self and the body is certainly questioned as the self 
of these twins seems to be shared between the two. 
Dennett claims that the self is not identical with the body and in doing so supports 
the claim that the boundaries of the self do not, as we usually assume, lie at the skin.  
Ranging from something as mundane as an arm that has fallen asleep, to a brain in a vat, 
to Siamese selves, Dennett uses a variety of examples to illustrate this point. 
 
The Apparent Unity of the Self 
Dennett further challenges our intuitions about the self by questioning its unity.  
According to the Multiple Drafts Model, there exists within the brain a framework of 
ongoing revision and editing that processes incoming stimuli to produce narratives or 
drafts.  One might assume that in order for this process to work, there must be a boss, or 
supervisor that approves the different drafts of the narrative as they are composed.  It 
would seem that when a stimulus is encountered, the appropriate part of the brain 




the unified self (Dennett, 1991, 113).  This final viewer, you could say, must be the real 
self – the “boss” inside the body (Dennett, 1991, 431).   
Dennett claims that indeed, there does seem to be an overseer of the activities 
within the brain.  It is for this reason that we attribute selves to the complex systems that 
we encounter, including ourselves.  It is practical and reasonable to posit a self for each 
individual and to organize our interpretation of that system’s behaviour around that self.  
Because of the appearance of unity, we take the intentional stance and are able to 
effectively explain and predict the system’s behaviour.   
Dennett claims, however, that this unity, this internal commander, is in fact an 
illusion.  We are unreliable sources when it comes to knowing what is going on inside of 
our brains, and even less knowledgeable about what is going on in the brains of others.  
Thus, although it may seem to us that within each system there is a singular chief of 
command dictating the words to be spoken and actions taken, this is not the case.  When 
incoming stimuli is interpreted and revised, it is not then sent to head-quarters for 
approval.   
Once a particular “observation” of some feature has been made, by a 
specialized, localized portion of the brain, the information content thus 
fixed does not have to be sent somewhere else to be rediscriminated by 
some “master” discriminator. (Dennett, 1991, 113)   
 
There is no internal, unified “master discriminator”.   
In considering this claim, one might ask, “Who is in control here?  Is there some 
overall being who can dictate what will happen?  Or is there just anarchy, with neurons 
firing helter-skelter, and come what may (Dennett, 1981, 342)?”  Dennett answers this 
question by explaining the “miracle” that happens when the different specialists in the 




By yoking these independently evolved specialist organs together in 
common cause, and thereby giving their union vastly enhanced 
powers, this virtual machine, this software of the brain, performs a sort 
of internal political miracle: It creates a virtual captain of the crew 
without elevating any of them to long-term dictatorial power.  Who’s 
in charge?  First one coalition and then another, shifting in ways that 
are not chaotic. (1991, 228) 
 
Rather than an internal boss, there is the fictional self, the center of narrative 
gravity around which the multiple drafts revolve and are centred (Dennett, 1991, 128).  
This self is not a part of the system – not even a very important and critical part.  “We are 
not the captains of our ships” Dennett claims; “there is no conscious self that is 
unproblematically in command of the mind’s resources.  Rather, we are somewhat 
disunified (Dennett, 1986, 113)”.  The narrative self is the result of the system itself, the 
product of the combined efforts of the different parts of the brain, the body and the rest of 
our environment.   
 
Communication Reinforces the Illusion 
One of the reasons we are so convinced that there must be an internal observer 
checking over the work that is produced by the brain is communication.  By taking the 
intentional stance and a heterophenomenological approach, we have already assumed that 
“that there is someone home doing the talking, an Author of the Record, a Meaner of all 
the meanings” (Dennett, 1991, 228).  But Dennett claims that assuming this “is not quite 
equivalent to positing an inner system that is Boss of the body, the Puppeteer controlling 
the puppet (1991, 228-229)”.  Rather than viewing the verbal behaviour of a subject as 




“of which the language-producing system is itself a proper part” (Dennett, 1991, 251) 
along with the rest of the body and parts of the subject’s environment.   
 
Review 
Here in Section Four we have at last reached the final statement of Dennett’s 
theory of the self.  The self is an abstract entity, which functions as the centre of narrative 
gravity for a system.  This theoretical tool is useful for organizing, understanding and 
predicting the behaviour of the system.  “When a portion of the world comes in this way 
to compose a skein of narratives, that portion of the world is an observer.  That is what it 
is for there to be an observer in the world, a something it is like something to be (Dennett, 
1991, 137)”.  As we have explored this conception of the self, we have seen that 
Dennett’s theory provides several challenges to our ordinary intuitions.  First of all, while 
we ordinarily assume the boundaries of the self to be the skin, Dennett’s theory opens up 
the self to a more flexible and fuzzy outer limit.  Second, Dennett challenges our 
understanding of the relationship between the body and the self, claiming that the self is 
not simply the body, but rather the system as a whole including the body.  Finally, and 
along the same lines, Dennett disassembles the unity of the self, arguing that there is no 
internal master and commander, but rather a global self that results from the various parts 






As we began our investigation of the nature of the self, and our exposition of 
Dennett’s theory in particular, we realized that such a subjective issue is difficult to 
access using the tools and methodology of science.  In Section One we explored this 
problem, looking at Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, asking what it is like to be 
another human being, and considering the trap of our own perspective.  Dennett’s 
solution to the problem of objectively answering a subjective question is 
heterophenomenology.  Through this, and the intentional stance, we are able to work with 
a subject’s reports of her own experiences and understand her phenomenological world 
without leaving the realm of science.  In Section Two we explored this approach and saw 
that it allows us to interpret the subject as a rational agent.  In Section Three we aimed to 
move beyond the rational agent to a self that is more like those we encounter in our 
regular lives.  Through Dennett’s comparison between analyzing the text of the subject 
and analyzing a fictional text, we began to see the added complexity that this brings to 
Dennett’s theory.  By considering the reviseability, indeterminacy and discord between 
what seems and what is, within the phenomenological world of the subject, we gained a 
deeper understanding of Dennett’s theory of the self.  This understanding went even 
deeper in Section Four as we moved on to consider Dennett’s claim that the self is a 
centre of narrative gravity – an abstract theoretical entity around which everything in the 
life of the subject revolves.  We considered his Multiple Drafts Model, where the 
different parts of the brain are continually editing and revising their interpretations of 




This conception of the self clearly challenges many of the intuitions that we 
commonly have about the self, and we explored these in Section Four as well.  First, the 
narrative self challenges our assumption that the boundaries of the self lie at the skin.  As 
an abstract, rather than physical, or immaterial entity, the narrative self has boundaries 
that are fuzzy and flexible.  Second, the relationship between the body and the self is put 
into question.  Dennett argues that although the body plays a significant role in the 
creation of the self, the two are not identical.  Finally, Dennett challenges the unity of the 
self, claiming that the brain is in fact composed of a variety of specialized parts, which 
work together with the body and the environment to construct the self.  This contrasts our 
ordinary intuition that the self is an internal “boss” whose wishes are executed through 






Through this exploration of Dennett’s theory, we have come across several unique 
and interesting conditions, real and imaginary, which have served to exemplify the 
unintuitive claims that Dennett makes.  We have encountered MPD, FPD, split-brain 
patients, a brain in a vat, a digital brain, and a body with no brain.  Each of these has 
played its part in helping Dennett to construct and defend his theory of the narrative self.  
These examples are intriguing and persuasive, undoubtedly causing us to reconsider our 
assumptions about the self.  While in much of science it is possible to test a hypothesis 
through experiments where there are controls and changing variables, in examining the 
human self this is not possible.  Rather, scientists and philosophers are forced either to 
construct them through imagination and idealization, or to wait and watch for these types 
of extraordinary cases of dysfunction or exceptionality.  Through these cases the potential 
for learning is significant.  Without a doubt, unusual cases such as these have played, and 
will continue to play a significant role in our understanding of human experience. 
Although these types of exceptional situations have been explored extensively, 
what both Dennett and the analytic philosophical community as a whole have failed to 
consider is an experience that stands alone in simultaneous commonality and uniqueness: 
pregnancy.  Throughout the history of science, and indeed academic investigation as a 
whole, the female perspective has been severely underrepresented, if not entirely ignored.  
It does not come as a surprise then that pregnancy, a distinctly female process, has 
remained largely unexplored despite its enormous informative potential as a unique and 
counter-intuitive phenomenon.  In particular, the evidence provided by the experience of 




In pregnancy we see the boundaries of the self confused – the fetus seems to be an other 
within the confines of the skin.  The unity of the self is also challenged as there seem to 
be two selves within one self and the pregnant woman becomes two-and-one.  Lastly, the 
pregnant woman feels as though she has become a new self, questioning the necessary 
diachronic identity of the self.   
As we move on to Chapter Three, we will explore these issues within the pregnant 
experience and I will argue that pregnancy challenges our ordinary assumptions about the 
self.  As we have seen in this chapter, Dennett’s theory of the self does the same.  
Because of this, pregnancy stands as an ideal example to be used for the support of 
Dennett’s theory of the narrative self.  Furthermore, Dennett’s theory provides an ideal 
context in which to validate and clarify the experiences of pregnant woman.  To this end, 
in Chapter Four, after exploring the conceptual issues of selfhood within the pregnant 





Chapter Three: Pregnancy and the Self 
Introduction 
We tend to make at least few assumptions about the self that, as we have seen, do 
not hold in every case.  We assume that a human being maintains the same self over time.  
This is a convenient assumption to make, as it simplifies tasks such as the ascription of 
praise and blame; if we can assume that the person who was seen committing the crime in 
the past is the same person whom we see before us now, we can rightly blame the person 
before us for that crime and punish accordingly. The assumption of diachronic identity 
has been influentially challenged by Derek Parfit’s account of personal identity (1971), 
which we considered briefly in Chapter One.  Dennett’s theory dovetails nicely with 
Parfit’s, but has implications reaching beyond diachronic identity.  His theory also 
questions our assumptions about synchronic identity – that at any one time, there is only 
one self per body.  This assumption simplifies interpersonal behaviour significantly, and 
it is hard to imagine how we would behave without this as our default. A further 
assumption that we have considered extensively is our belief that the boundaries of the 
self lie at the skin.   
While our usual experience gives us no reason to question them, pregnancy 
provides evidence that erodes these background assumptions.  Through a brief review of 
the literature, as well as a detailed consideration of each of these issues – boundaries, 
plurality and diachronic identity – we will see that pregnancy provides a significant 





The Pregnant Experience: Beginning  
A brief look through a selection of the literature that exists on the pregnant 
experience will begin to demonstrate how pregnancy can substantially challenge our 
assumptions about selves.  We will start to understand the questions and realizations that 
arise as women discover and explore the pivotal experience of pregnancy.  Carol Poston 
points out that, as a process encountered throughout time and throughout the world, birth, 
accompanied only by death, is an essential human experience – it is something that every 
human being experiences.  But “unlike death”, she states,  
birth has an involved witness who lives to tell the story, a birthing 
woman.  Her experience is of universal importance, because it is she 
who is caught up in that elemental activity, childbirth, with hurricane 
intensity. (Carol H. Poston, 1978, as quoted by Klassen, 2001, 1) 
 
Pregnancy has remained relatively unexplored in the philosophical domain 
despite its simultaneous commonality and uniqueness.  It is common in the sense that it is 
experienced by many, and yet unique in the challenges it presents for some of our usual 
ideas about the self.  As a distinctly gendered issue, the neglect that pregnancy has faced 
in the philosophical domain is not entirely surprising: 
I can find a hundred quotations from well-known writers that will clarify 
and inspire my own hazy impressions of these aspects of life, but for 
motherhood there is only the over-sentimentality of the women’s 
magazine articles, or the chilly approach of the medical popularizers.  
Perhaps it is because most of the great writers cannot have had any 
direct experience of motherhood, and of the great writers who were also 
women, most were rebelling against womanhood and would not touch 
such a female subject. (Lewis, 1931, 203) 
 
Although it is a universal and shared experience throughout humanity (pregnancy has 




nonetheless been ignored.  There has been little to no serious philosophical research done 
to understand this fundamental human experience.  Many of the resources used here are 
of an anecdotal nature, focussing on relaying the stories of pregnant women.  As we have 
discussed in Chapter One, we are often mistaken in our reports about what it is like to be 
us.  It is with some caution, therefore, that we consider and take into account these 
depictions of the pregnant experience.  In Chapter Four we will consider more 
extensively the value of the anecdotal nature of the existing literature in this area. 
In her paper “Pregnant Embodiment” (1984) Iris Young creates a vivid picture of 
the questions and confusions that arise through the experience of pregnancy.  Although I 
take it for granted, as a non-pregnant individual I experience a clear distinction between 
the experiences that are mine, and the experiences that aren’t.  I have special rights to 
what goes on in my body, in my own phenomenological world.  I experience the world 
subjectively – in a way that no one else does.  The things I experience are things that are 
happening to me.  These ideas seem obvious, but Young gives a very different picture of 
subjective experience from the perspective of pregnancy: 
I feel a little tickle, a gurgle in my belly.  It is my feeling, my insides, and 
it feels somewhat like a gas bubble, but it is not; it is different, in another 
place, belonging to another, another that is nevertheless my body…the 
fetus’s movements are wholly mine, completely within me, conditioning 
my experience and space.  Only I have access to these movements from 
their origin, as it were.  For months only I can witness this life within me, 
and it is only under my direction of where to put their hands that others 
can feel these movements.  I have a privileged relation to this other life, 
not unlike that which I have to my dreams and thoughts, which I can tell 
someone but which cannot be an object for both of us in the same way…[I 
have] this sense of the movements within me as mine, even though they 
are another’s…In pregnancy I literally do not have a firm sense of where 





Here, Young faces the question of boundaries.  She depicts her own experience of how 
the traditional boundaries between self and other can be erased within pregnancy.   
Naomi Wolf, in her book Misconceptions (2001), studies the experiences of many 
women as they encounter pregnancy and the major changes that accompany it.  She also 
delves deeply into her own experiences during pregnancy, facing many of the questions 
and, as she aptly names the book, misconceptions that surround it.  She remembers 
thinking that perhaps,  
a pregnant woman was an implicit challenge to the idea of the autonomous 
“individual” upon which basic Western notions of law, of rights, and even 
of selfhood were based.  There are two people inside me now… 
Pregnancy, it seemed, requires a different kind of philosophy. (32) 
 
Here, Wolf begins to question the issue of the plurality of the self.  Pregnancy seems to 
imply that there can be two selves, the fetus and the woman, included within one self, the 
pregnant woman. 
Finally, Joan Raphael-Leff, in her book Pregnancy: The Inside Story (1993), 
considers the experiences of many pregnant women, and again, speaks from her own 
experience as well.  She highlights the major shift in perspective that often takes place 
through pregnancy: 
[The pregnant woman] is literally possessed by another: she throbs with 
the other’s heartbeat, excretes his/her waste, is jolted into fitful waking 
and stung to the quick with each lively quiver of the baby’s being. Day 
and night there is no respite…Craving the time when she will be herself, 
she wonders whether she can ever again feel as unself-consciously 
singular as she did.  Integrity takes on a different meaning now that she 
has become divisible. (16-17) 
 
Questions that do not ordinarily arise for a non-pregnant individual are natural in the 
process of pregnancy.  Raphael-Leff identifies a divide between the pre-pregnant and the 




and unity of her self. Pregnancy, however, brings these subconscious assumptions to the 
fore, necessitating a response that goes beyond our usual experience. 
These three authors have given us a brief glimpse into the three issues we wish to 
consider in depth as we explore the pregnant experience.  Boundaries, plurality and 
diachronic identity are three concepts concerning the self that pregnancy causes us to 
question.  Some common assumptions about these aspects of selfhood are simple and 
intuitive: the boundaries of the self lie at the skin, there is only one self connected to each 
body at a time, and each individual remains the same self over time.  These idealizations 
are convenient and help to simplify our interactions with others.  However, through an 
exploration of the pregnant experience we encounter evidence that indicates that these 
assumptions are too idealized and that the simplicity they provide comes at the cost of 
ignoring a central human experience.  As we explore the boundaries, plurality and 
diachronic identity of the self, we will discover that indeed, the pregnant experience 





Section One: Boundaries 
The relationship between the fetus and the woman bearing it may be experienced 
in a number of different ways.  One perspective is to view the fetus as being fully 
separate from the pregnant woman.  Here the fetus is seen as another, indeed an other – 
something that is not a part of the self of the pregnant woman.  The existence of the fetus 
within the boundaries of the pregnant woman’s skin challenges our usual assumptions 
about the boundaries of the self.  If we assume that whatever is inside the skin is a part of 
the self, to experience the fetus as other is nonsense.  As Philipa Rothfield explains,  
One of the unique features of pregnancy is its incorporation of an-
other within.  In philosophy, the external world is all that which is not 
the self.  Interiority is taken to include the self and only the self.  If I 
move, then, I am moving my body, my self.  Such a demarcation 
between the inside and the outside cannot be sustained throughout 
pregnancy. (1996, 5) 
 
Raphael-Leff concurs: 
From the pregnant woman’s point of view, another being has in 
actuality come to reside inside her as her body becomes physically 
occupied by another.  The embryo is separate yet part of the woman’s 
interior. (1993, 9)  
 
Although the fetus undeniably resides within the “interior” of the woman’s body, inside 
the skin, from this perspective it is nevertheless a separate entity, an other, and thus the 
skin fails as the boundary of the pregnant self.   
There are two ways in which the skin can fail as the boundaries of the self.  The 
boundaries of the skin can be crossed from both directions: elements that are considered 
other can move within them, and elements that are considered self can move outside 
them.  In the case where the pregnant woman sees the fetus as other, the skin fails as the 




clear whether the fetus must be considered a self in some way in order for this boundary 
crossing to be significant.  Our intuitions on this question seem to be inconsistent.  On the 
one hand, should we not consider the fetus to be a self of any kind, we could view it 
simply as a trespasser on the same level as a pacemaker or a replacement hip.  These 
uncontroversial additions are routinely made to the body without any question as to a 
compromise or failure of the skin-as-boundary assumption.  It seems that the other must 
be another self, not just something other, in order for the boundaries of the skin to come 
into question.  Someone who has a screw in his knee does not consider this significant in 
any way.
5
  In these types of border crossings (cases of screws, hips, pacemakers and so 
on) we do unquestioningly accept these self-less artifacts as parts of our selves.   
On the other hand, there do seem to be cases where we feel that we have been 
invaded in some unacceptable way by something that is not a self.  In the cases of 
tumours, tapeworms or even viruses, we feel the invasion – we are distressed by the 
border-crossing that has taken place, despite the fact that the invader is not another self.
6
  
In these cases we do not willingly incorporate the other into our selves, and in fact we 
may even come to define ourselves by our ability to withstand it (for example, an 
individual who has had cancer and lived through it, may identify herself as a cancer-
survivor).  
Perhaps the body itself plays a role in determining our intuitive responses to these 
different types of trespassers.  In the first case, where I intuitively accept the invader as a 
part of my self, I hope that my body too will accept the implanted object and not reject it.  
In the case of a tumour or worm, however, the body is depended upon to reject the alien 
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put its defence systems to good use.  It is in these cases that our intuitions lean towards 
rejecting the invader, even though it is not a self in any sense.   
 It seems then that the status of the invader as self or non-self is not crucial to 
one’s intuitive acceptance or rejection of it as a part of one’s self.  Our intuitions may 
have more to do with the purpose of the invader – be it for our harm, or for our good, as 
is often demonstrated by the body’s physical response to it.  The fetus then, stands as a 
challenge to the skin-as-boundary assumption regardless of its status as a self.  It is 
pertinent, nonetheless, to briefly consider the selfhood of the fetus before we continue on 
to explore the pregnant woman’s interpretation of it as other. 
 
The Fetus as a Sort of Self  
The fetus does not seem to warrant consideration as a full-fledged self.  It clearly 
lacks some of the hallmarks that we typically associate with selves, such as having a 
point of view, and being (some version of) a thinking being.  Furthermore, looking at 
Dennett’s understanding of selves, it does not seem to have a complete or complex 
narrative to speak of
7
.  There are several reasons, however, to consider it at least an 
incomplete or dependent self.  As we have started to see in this chapter, women often 
describe their experiences of pregnancy as sharing their body with someone else:  
Queer, to sit in a roomful of people and feel that alien life moving 
restlessly inside you, unseen and unasked guest! ‘…Request the pleasure 
of Mr. and Mrs. Lewis at their party…’  No, not just Mr. and Mrs. 
Lewis, but another presence, the unseen guest, the hidden number, 
getting in free at movies, necessitating no extra seat on trains, needing 
no social security card, never needing new clothes or a roof over its 
head. (Lewis, 1931, 61) 
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The “living separateness” of the fetus makes carrying it very unlike carrying a mere 
object, or even gaining weight (Lewis, 1931, 127).  Pregnant woman often experience 
some degree of social relationship with her fetus, which does not typically occur with 
non-selves. The fetus is commonly an active participant in the lived experience of the 
pregnant woman, and particularly in the experience that she has of herself.  Nearing the 
end of the pregnancy, the fetus has developed a variety of responses to external stimuli as 
well as wants and needs.  For these reasons, while the fetus may not be a complete or 
independent self, it doesn’t seem to belong in the same category as a pin in a broken wrist 
or a kidney stone.  Rather the fetus should be considered at least a dependent self, or an 
incomplete self.  In Section Two of this chapter we will discuss this implicit taxonomy of 
selves in more detail. 
 
The Fetus as Other 
The pregnant woman who sees the fetus as other may have a variety of responses 
to it; she may see it positively as a being with which she is happy to share her body and 
its resources, or she may see it as an intrusive being that is leaching from her from within.  
The ultrasound plays an interesting role in the development of a pregnant woman’s 
relationship with her fetus.  In researching the development of the ultrasound, Ann 
Oakley discovered the following perspective: 
When a mother undergoes ultrasound scanning of the fetus, this seems a 
great opportunity for her to meet her child socially and in this way one 
hopes to view him…as a companion aboard rather than as a parasite… a 
great opportunity to enable mothers to form an early affectionate bond to 





It seems that through the ultrasound, the social relationship between the woman and the 
fetus she carries is extended.  The letter quoted above implies that women who do not 
have access to ultrasound scanning may have a different and perhaps more limited 
relationship with the fetus.  Somewhat tongue in cheek, Oakley responds to this 
proposition stating that through the ultrasound, “antenatal care has finally discovered 
mother love” (185).  While it is not at all clear that a women requires an introduction to 
the fetus in order to form a bond with it, the ultrasound does seem to have some effect on 
the attitude of the pregnant woman towards her fetus, in some cases resulting in a 
decrease in harmful behaviour such as smoking and drinking alcohol (Oakley, 185).  
On the other hand, however, the ultrasound may contribute to the perception of 
what Vangie Bergum calls “the baby in the machine” (1989, 144).  Technological devices 
such as the ultrasound and fetal heart monitor can relocate the focus of those involved 
with the pregnancy from the pregnant woman, where the fetus is actually located, to the 
machines, which monitor and depict the fetus through visual and auditory means.  It 
seems that this may in fact have the opposite effect on the attitude of the pregnant woman 
towards the fetus, resulting in a sense of alienation from her own lived experience and 
stretching the connection she feels to the fetus. 
In any case, the ultrasound does serve to illustrate the otherness of the fetus to the 
pregnant woman, even though it resides within the boundaries of her skin.  The skin is 
not a sufficient boundary for the self, as it is possible to have something other enter into 
it.  
Abigail Lewis illustrates this well when she explains her experience of the 




The baby has taken shape very suddenly; what were formless lumps and 
gentle motions two weeks ago have now become a hard, definite 
arrangement of shapes, evidently backed up with bone, of which I am 
becoming increasingly aware as something separate from myself that 
wants to be let out. (1931, 121)   
 
Another woman echoes this feeling, when she comments, “It’s peculiar, I look the same 
but there’s a baby growing contentedly inside me.  There are two of us not one of me 
(Raphael-Leff, 1993, 78)”.   
For the pregnant woman what is growing within her is not just a part of her body, 
as extra weight would be.  Lewis contrasts pregnancy to weight gain and claims that 
others “cannot really know what it is to have some fourteen extra pounds of weight 
oppressing one’s very centre of gravity; it is not at all like being fat; the living 
separateness of that weight makes it far heavier (1931, 127)”.  Men, and women who 
have not been pregnant, will be hard pressed to make sense of these experiences.  Here, 
the pregnant woman experiences a being that is fully other and yet nevertheless inside her 
body, within the boundaries of her skin. 
As we begin to understand these experiences, we see that pregnancy highlights 
questions that are often left unasked in the core analytic literature on selfhood.  
Statements like, “I’m beginning to feel there really isn’t room for both of us inside my rib 
cage (Lewis, 1931, 82)”, or, “it is still an awkward thing to sleep with (Lewis, 1931, 
149)” express the uniqueness of the pregnant experience.  Lewis explains that after her 
baby was born, she “began to remember how it feels to have a waist, how it feels to be 
empty of all but yourself inside (1931, 122)”.  To the person who has never been 
pregnant, this seems like a strange thing to say; it may be tempting to dismiss it as 




I don’t typically think of the interior of my body as being “empty”.  I don’t find it a 
novelty to have only my own singular self inside of me.  Our usual experiences leave 
hidden the questions that pregnancy brings to light. 
Having considered the perspective of pregnant women where the fetus is viewed 
as an other, it becomes clear that the boundaries of the self cannot be drawn simply at the 
skin.  If it is possible, and indeed not uncommon, to have an other within the boundaries 
of the skin, then the skin cannot be the boundary of the self.   
 
The Pregnant Woman and the Fetus as Connected 
Although a pregnant woman may view the fetus as other, a being that is distinct 
and separate from her self, there is no doubt that the fetus and the pregnant woman are 
connected in some way. This too prompts important and urgent questions about the self.   
Studies have shown that “the condition and viability of the fetus [is] profoundly 
influenced by the mother’s mental and emotional state” (Oakley, 1984, 23) and that 
“maternal psychological variables” can affect the development of the fetus (Wolf, 2001, 
109, 111).  Raphael-Leff explains that, “as mothers have suspected throughout time, in 
ways mild and intense, properties of each woman’s emotional and material world 
infiltrate the womb (1993, 40-41)”.  When she becomes pregnant, a woman’s emotions 
and mental behaviour are no longer just her own.  Her own ability to cope and adjust to 
stressful or potentially harmful situations becomes her ability to protect the well being of 
the fetus.  In no other relationship does the well being of one human so strongly affect the 
well being of the other.  A pregnant woman is no longer an independent, self-centred 




ordinary relationship between two individuals, it becomes difficult to draw a line between 
the pregnant woman and the fetus.  
This difficulty continues even after the birth, where the mother and the newborn 
are connected in a way that might be more metaphysically significant than a simple 
social, familial or emotional relationship.  The language used here illustrates this: 
infant and mother, immediately after partition, [should not] be treated as 
two separate creatures, to be cared for in separate parts of a building by 
separate nursing staffs.  They are still a continuum, and sensitive 
treatment of the one is incomplete without closeness to the other. (Rich, 
1976, 180) 
 
On the birthing table we seem to have more than one, but less than two, selves.  Pre-natal 
experience highlights the connection between the fetus and the woman and implies that 
the pregnant woman has become more than a single self.  For the post-natal pair, though 
there are now two distinct bodies, the connection between them implies that the mother 
and newborn are less than two individual selves
8
.  During and after pregnancy, 
delineating the boundaries of the self is complicated. 
As we have considered the self it has become clear that the boundary separating 
self from other must be understood as fuzzy and flexible to account for the experiences of 
pregnancy.  Consideration of the fetus as other and the connection between the fetus and 
the pregnant woman demonstrate that pregnant women do not see inside and outside, self 
and other, as two clearly defined categories.  Pregnancy causes us to reconsider 
assumptions about the self that we usually take for granted, in particular our default 
intuition that the boundary of the self is the skin. 
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Section Two: Plurality 
The Pregnant Woman as Two-and-one 
As we continue to explore the relationship between the pregnant woman and the 
fetus, we encounter the possibility of a plural self.  In Section One we considered the 
pregnant experience from the perspective of the fetus as other, a being separate from the 
pregnant woman.  There is, however, an overwhelming sense that this is a somewhat 
simplified view of the situation.  As Rich states, “I do not perceive myself as a walled 
city into which certain emissaries are received and from which others are excluded.  The 
question is much more various and complicated (1976, 63)”.  It seems more true to the 
experiences of pregnant women to conclude that the pregnant woman and the fetus are 
both separate and the same. “One can become two, or even, a sort of in-between one and 
two inside of oneself, a relation between bodies within a body.  At once one body and 
more than one body (Rothfield, 1996, 1)”.  As Young points out, the “inner movements” 
of the pregnant woman’s body “belong to another being, yet they are not other, because 
her body boundaries shift (1984, 274)”.  The fetus is other at least in the sense that it has 
come, in part, from other (the father) and will become other once it is an independent 
child.  But during pregnancy the self-other distinction is blurred.  Vangie Bergum 
illuminates this phenomenon: 
The being ‘with’ child is not the ‘with’ that means ‘as a companion,’ or 
‘next-to’, or ‘in the charge of.’…being ‘with child’ is a primordial 
relationship, peculiar to women who carry within their own bodies the 
body of another…Being ‘with child’ is a commingling, an entangling, an 
interlacing that goes beyond companionship.  It is a mysterious union, 
unlike any other.  Not only is the fetus bound to the woman through the 
nourishing pathways running through the umbilical cord, but child and 
woman are truly one body…What affects the woman affects the fetus, 




one, an indissoluble whole, yet two, a mother and a child.  There is no 
closer union. (1989, 53) 
 
Bergum claims that the mother and the fetus are both two and one at the same time.  It is 
this idea, the idea of two-and-one, that we hear repeated in many forms as we explore 
women’s experiences of pregnancy.  Through this idea we begin to explore the possibility 
of a plural self.  Can the self be expanded to include that which may also be considered 
other?  Can there be two selves within one self? 
These questions are highlighted when we look at Raphael-Leff’s provocative 
description of pregnancy: 
Conception is the beginning of a bizarre story.  In pregnancy, there are 
two bodies, one inside the other.  Two people live under one skin… When 
so much of life is dedicated to maintaining our integrity as distinct beings, 
this bodily tandem is an uncanny fact.  Two-in-one-body also constitutes a 
biological enigma, as for reasons we do not quite understand, the mother-
to-be’s body suppresses her immunological defences to allow the partly 
foreign body to reside within her. (1993, 8) 
 
Raphael-Leff highlights the fact that pregnancy brings up issues that our other ordinary 
experiences do not.  Whereas in the rest of society individuality and independence are the 
norm, pregnancy presents the exception.   
…the pregnant woman must reverse all she has striven to establish since 
her childhood:…people are separate, each inhabits his or her own body, 
and each is either male or female.  Not only is there another being inside 
her, but it has about a fifty-two percent chance of being male. (Raphael-
Leff, 1993, 19) 
 
Socially, biologically, and even logically, pregnancy seems to break the rules.  It 
would seem that even the Law of Non-Contradiction is overturned.  “To ‘remember’ that 
this enormous lump is both me and not-me is to be able to move as myself, to incorporate 
the other as both self and non-self. (Rothfield, 1996, 7)”.  The woman is both herself and 




It becomes especially clear in pregnancy that…the metaphysical 
dichotomous categories of subject and object, and self and other, fail to 
describe our incarnate situation, for the subject is blurred and diffused in 
pregnancy.  A woman is inhabited by a growing sentience that is not 
truly other to herself (Bigwood, 1993, 58-59).   
 
“Pregnancy throws into question body boundaries which since babyhood have defined 
the separateness of her own self within her own skin (Raphael-Leff, 1993, 16)”.  
Assumptions about boundaries, unity and plurality that are typically taken for 
granted are questioned from within pregnancy.  Until pregnancy, a woman’s 
independence as a “distinct being,” her status as an individual, and her logical 
categorization of the world into self and other, all remain largely unchallenged as simple 
unconscious assumptions.  Until pregnancy, she has lived, as many men do for the 
duration of their lives, as an independent self, contained within one body, separate from 
other selves.  Through pregnancy, these assumptions are exposed and reconsidered.    
The confusion of two-and-one continues to grow as other people in the pregnant 
woman’s life become involved.  For example, others will often ask to “feel the baby” by 
putting their hand on the woman’s belly.  One woman contemplates this: “I don’t think 
they were patting my stomach, even though it was my stomach they were patting” she 
says.  In other words, the “touching of a woman’s body, as baby, again shows the 
remarkable and unique experience of pregnancy – being another while being oneself 
(Bergum, 1989, 58-59)”.  Young explains how even when she touches her own belly the 
confusion exists: “I feel myself being touched and touching simultaneously…the belly is 





Again we see that our assumptions have been shaken by the pregnant experience.  
For the pregnant woman, “her oneness is replaced with two, forcing a new kind of 
confrontation between self and other, fusion and separateness (Raphael-Leff, 1993, 31)”.  
Beginning to understand the pregnant woman’s experience of being two-and-one brings 
up many questions about the possible plurality of the self and challenges us to look 
beyond our usual experiences and assumptions. 
 
Two Types of Plurality: Compound or Complex 
The concept of a plural self is a complicated one and can be expanded in a variety 
of ways.  We will consider a Hilary Putnam-inspired interpretation in Section Two of the 
following chapter; however, another helpful perspective presents itself here, using 
categories borrowed from grammar.
9
  A sentence can fall into three basic categories on 
the basis of its grammatical structure: simple, compound and complex. A simple sentence 
is atomic; it contains a single independent clause, and cannot be divided into any smaller 
sentences. A compound sentence comprises two or more simple sentences joined together 
using a word like “and” or “but”. And a complex sentence is created when a simple 
sentence and at least one dependent clause are combined.  In this case, although the 
simple sentence could stand on its own, the dependent clause could not. 
Perhaps we can understand selves in a similar way.  Assuming that there is are 
cases of simple, unitary selves, we could imagine either a compound self or a complex 
self within one body.  A psychologically compound self would consist of two distinct 
selves, whereas a psychologically complex self would be made up of the elements of 
more than one self, but would in fact be fewer than two distinct and independent selves. 
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One of the selves would be complete, but the other would be incomplete, or dependent in 
some way.   We can also imagine a compound self and a complex self in the case of 
multiple bodies.  A bodily compound self would consist of two distinct bodies, whereas a 
bodily complex self would be realized in the combination of a human body with some 
other physical addition(s).  The added part could be from another human body, such as a 
brain, or could perhaps be a technological extension of the initial human body such as a 
remote sensing device or even something like a cell phone (as suggested by Chalmers and 
Clark (1998), as we discussed in Chapter One).   
We have then a taxonomy of six different types of plurality outlined here for 
selfhood.  A self can be simple, compound or complex, both bodily and psychologically.  
There are then nine different combinations of these different possibilities.  Listed bodily 
then psychologically with possible examples in brackets: simple-simple (a typical 
individual), simple-compound (MPD), simple-complex (early stage pregnant woman), 
compound-simple (FPD), compound-compound (two typical individuals in relationship), 
compound-complex (mother and newborn), complex-simple (typical individual with 
technological extension), complex-compound (MPD individual with technological 
extension), complex-complex (pregnant woman with technological extension).  I do not, 
however, claim that each of these possibilities is sometimes realized. 
A few of these cases are of particular interest to us here.  Depending on the stage 
of the pregnancy, the pregnant woman seems to be an example of a psychologically 
complex self with a body somewhere between simple, complex and compound.  There 
are more than one, but less than two selves present, both psychologically, and bodily.  




psychologically complex self.  There are two distinct bodies, but again, the number of 
selves falls somewhere between one and two.  We can see the similarities between these 
cases and the case of a complex sentence.  In the cases of pregnancy and motherhood, the 
woman (pregnant or mother), is made up of an independent self and the infant (born or 
unborn), who seems to be the dependent or incomplete self which is nonetheless a part of 
the self of the woman.  Using the structure provided by the categorization of sentences is 
helpful in that it gives us a reference point for understanding different types of selves and 
the complex web of relationships that can exist between selves and bodies.  However, 
these categories (like most categories) are not simple or clear-cut.  The definitive 
placement of a particular case into one category or another is often made possible only 
through the idealization or artificial simplification of that case. 
 
A “Simple” Self? 
To begin our exploration of this analogy, we assumed that there does exist a 
simple, unitary self.  Having considered the other options, however, it seems quite 
possible that all modern human beings are at least bodily complex selves.  The 
presentation of the extended mind hypothesis by Chalmers and Clark (which we 
considered in Chapter One) pushes us to consider an extended self, which takes external 
tools to be a part of the self.  There seems to be some evidence that the brain has become 
rather adept at incorporating things that are outside of our bodily boundaries into the self, 
as Chalmers and Clark suggest.   
The so-called “phantom Blackberry” phenomenon is an interesting example of 




a vibrating Blackberry (or other personal device) when it is not actually there, is not 
uncommon.  According to Stanford University psychologist and technology specialist B. 
J. Fogg, “anecdotal evidence suggests ‘people feel the phone is part of them’ and ‘they’re 
not whole’ without their phones (Simon, 2007)”.  In these cases then, and even in less 
dramatic ones, it seems that technology has driven the self away from simplicity and 
towards complexity.  We don’t need to suppose that this is ultimately the correct 
interpretation in order to recognize that our theory of selves should rule out the possibility 





Section Three: Diachronic Identity 
As we have considered the boundaries of the self and its possible plurality, we 
have seen that pregnancy provides substantial evidence to support the reconsideration of 
our intuitive assumptions about the self.  A further issue that pushes us in this direction is 
diachronic identity.  Given the intense, often traumatic, character of the experience, the 
pregnant woman seems particularly justified in asking a classic philosophical question 
about personal identity: “Am I the same woman I was before?”  The changes that 
pregnant women encounter physically, behaviourally and socially push us to rethink our 
understanding of the self, and particularly its continued identity over time.  
 
The Pregnant Self as a New Self 
While she was “being delivered of her baby,” one woman explains, “I did not 
understand that I was delivered of my identity at the same time (Oakley, 1979, 3)”.  This 
sentiment rings true for many women who have experienced pregnancy and childbirth.  
As they encounter the extreme changes that accompany pregnancy, many women find 
that they are creating both a self within their wombs, and also a new self of their own.  
Naomi Wolf, through listening to their stories, discovered that many women expressed a 
sense of regret after their pregnancies: “I wish someone could have let me know I would 
lose my self in the process of becoming a mother (2001, 2)”.  She depicts the struggle 
that many women experience: 
Indeed, the greatest loss for many new mothers is a kind of loss of self.  
…the death of the old identity – the independent, youthful self – and 
its rebirth into that hard-won, messier, more interdependent new 





Wolf explains that while the anticipation and excitement is undeniable in most pregnant 
women, there is an underlying sadness in their experience as well; “underneath their joy 
in their babies, [they were] quietly in mourning for some part of their earlier selves 
(2001, 7)”. Chesler portrays this vividly as she talks to her baby on his first birthday: 
Last year I died.  My life without you ended.  Our life together – only 
nine months! – ended too: abruptly and forever when you gave birth to 
me.  Being born into motherhood is the sharpest pain I’ve ever known.  
I’m a newborn mother: your age exactly, one year old today. (1979, 
281)  
 
The transitions that pregnant women may face are endless: independent to 
interdependent, “I” to “us”, professional to stay-at-home.  Through this process, many 
feel that the former self is dying and a new self is being born.   
Although few women in the West actually die in childbirth today, we 
deny the many symbolic deaths a contemporary pregnant woman 
undergoes: from the end of her solitary selfhood, to the loss of her 
prematernal shape, to the eclipse of her psychologically carefree 
identity, to the transformation of her marriage, to the decline in her 
status as a professional or worker. (Wolf, 2001, 7) 
 
Through understanding this experience and the changes that take place for a woman 
physically, behaviourally and socially, we question the temporal continuity of the self.  
Can one individual be made up of several different selves over time?  Can one self “die” 
and another be “born” to replace it?  These interesting and worthwhile questions arise out 
of the experiences of pregnant women and particularly, their experience of a loss of self.   
 
The Unfamiliar Body 
The transition from pre-pregnant self to pregnant self is made most obvious by the 
physical changes that take place in the body of the pregnant woman.  As the fetus 




now is very different than the person she was before she was pregnant – the self she is 
familiar with.  Although the cyclical nature of the female life includes ongoing change 
and development, pregnancy is unlike any other time in a woman’s life.  “Pregnancy 
dissolves familiar connections between the woman and her body which have hitherto 
been taken for granted.  She is no longer in sole possession of her own body (Raphael-
Leff, 1993, 16)”.  Again we see that our ordinary experiences pass by the questions that 
pregnancy reveals.  One woman describes her experience:  
I have been infiltrated…I have to lean back on the chair to write over my 
belly, legs apart, giving my belly as much room as possible.  My belly?  
All of the sudden it seems my belly has become too big too fast for me to 
adjust to it as mine. (Bigwood, 1993, 49) 
 
Pregnant women undergo changes in their physical body that are gradual, and yet at 
times, seem sudden and unexpected.  “I look in the mirror and don’t know who I’m 
looking at.  The baby takes so much.  Having another person there leaves little room for 
myself (Raphael-Leff, 1993, 10)”.  Phyllis Chesler exclaims, “‘I’ am not here anymore! I 
don’t inhabit my body any longer.  My consciousness merely hovers nearby... ‘I’ am not 
my rising stomach, my weight gain, my swelling feet.  ‘I’ remain unchanged (1979, 65)”.  
Even after the birth, it seems that the pre-pregnant body is not fully recovered.  At home 
with her baby, Chesler expresses her frustration: “my body won’t obey my will.  My 
body is not-me.  I have no body to use to get things done (1979, 132)”.   
As we can see, women often find that pregnancy includes the development of a 
body that is unfamiliar.  Through this experience, questions about the self arise.  We may 
consider the extent to which the body plays a role in the creation and formation of the 
self.  Is the pregnant self a new self?  When the body is changed so drastically, it seems 




Furthermore, in considering the perceived separation and distance between self and body 
that these women experience, we can begin to question the importance of the body to the 
self, and whether or not the body should be included, necessarily, as a part of the self.  
Through our investigation of pregnant women’s experiences, we have seen that the 
unfamiliarity of the body during pregnancy causes us to question our assumptions about 
the self – in particular the diachronic identity of the self.  
 
Unfamiliar Behaviour 
In addition to the unfamiliar body that a pregnant woman encounters, she often 
finds herself acting and feeling in ways that are strange and unusual to her.  Adrienne 
Rich uncovers this experience in the diary of a European woman: 
My face in the mirror looked alien to me.  My character blurred.  
Childish violent desires, unknown to me, came over me, and childish 
violent dislikes.  I am a coldly logical thinker, but at that time, my 
reasoning blurred and dissolved, impotent, into tears, another helpless, 
childish creature’s tears, not mine.  I was one and the other at once.  It 
stirred inside of me.  Could I control its movements with my will?  
Sometimes I thought I could, at other times I realized it was beyond 
my control.  I couldn’t control anything.  I was not myself.  And not 
for a brief, passing moment of rapture, which men, too, experience, but 
for nine watchful quiet months…Then it was born.  I heard it scream 
with a voice that was no longer mine. (1976, 167) 
 
Vangie Bergum describes a similar feeling during labour: “never in my life had I wailed 
like that before.  It was as if the cries didn’t belong to me (Bergum, 1989, 71)”.  Through 
these stories of unfamiliar actions and emotions, we understand the strangeness of the 
pregnant self to the pregnant woman.  In pregnancy there is an undeniable challenge to 




behaviour that is foreign and unfamiliar can result in the perception of a new and 
different self. 
The extreme changes in a woman’s hormonal make-up during pregnancy (Wolf, 
2001, 115-120) may provide a logical explanation for the seemingly extreme changes that 
take place both physically and behaviourally.  Nonetheless, these changes are significant 
enough to bring up questions of identity and selfhood.  When a woman feels that she has 
lost control, not only over her body, but over her emotions and behaviour as well, she 
may begin to question the connection between what she sees as her self (that which used 
to have control) and the behaviour and body with which she lives.  Who is the “I” that 
says “I am no longer myself”?  How is that “I” connected to the individual that appears in 
the mirror, or cries out with an unfamiliar voice?  These questions come to the fore 
within the pregnant experience.  Chesler vividly depicts her experiences in the following 
way:  
After so many years of disciplined energy, a stranger emerges from 
within: a lazy old woman!  A cranky baby!  A hopeless invalid! 
…Mysteriously I pull myself together.  I feel an impostor.  I am not 
myself.  (1979, 133) 
 
Unfamiliar Treatment 
The visible and hormonal changes that a pregnant woman experiences are 
complimented by social changes that become increasingly noticeable as she becomes 
more obviously pregnant.  People close to a pregnant woman may offer to do things for 
her, or give her advice about decisions she would normally make on her own.  Her spouse 
may begin to speak to her swelling abdomen as if there were another person there 




even go so far as to touch her pregnant belly.  The “personal space” of the pregnant 
woman is significantly altered as people feel at liberty to touch the pregnant woman’s 
body in ways that would be intrusive, and even overtly sexual, on the abdomen of a non-
pregnant woman.  While these different forms of unsolicited attention would be 
questionable and perhaps even unacceptable in other circumstances, for pregnant women 
the rules of social interaction seem to change.   
Naomi Wolf took particular note of the social changes surrounding her own 
pregnancy.  As she went to lectures and other speaking engagements, she noticed an 
increasing preoccupation with her belly among her audience members.  “A pregnant 
woman might feel like the same person,” she explains, “– but she sees others’ perceptions 
of herself shift and change (Wolf, 2001, 64)”.  Not only does she note the distraction of 
the physical changes taking place, she also remarks on the transitions taking place in her 
professional life: 
I could sense the social space given to my personality shifting and 
certain rooms – some of my favorite rooms – being quietly, indeed 
lovingly, but nonetheless very firmly, closed.  It was a loss of my former 
self that I felt very keenly. (Wolf, 2001, 65)  
 
On top of the unspoken social rules that are altered when a woman is pregnant, 
the official rules change as well.  Pregnant women are treated differently than other 
persons within the legal system.  The Geneva Convention prescribes special treatment for 
pregnant women who are arrested or detained, and they are exempt from punishment by 
death (Chapter 2, Article 76).  In countries like the United States and Australia, 
individuals can be punished for the death or injury of a fetus in addition to the 
punishment for harm to the pregnant woman (Seymour, 2000, 19). Furthermore, a 




law.  Pregnant women have been punished for things like declining medical care and 
neglecting to maintain an adequate diet (Seymour, 2000, 7).  It should be noted that this 
topic remains controversial in Canada, where, for example, Bill C-484, the “Unborn 
Victims of Crime Act” was heavily debated at its presentation in November, 2007 
(Lewis, 2008).  Nonetheless, the legal treatment of the pregnant woman implies that she 
is in a category of her own when it comes to legal obligation and responsibility.  
These relational aspects of pregnancy are significant in their own right, but also 
serve to illustrate that a theory of the self that aims to accommodate or explain those 
facets should have a social or relational component.  Dennett’s account of the narrative 
self satisfies this need quite well. 
  As a pregnant woman finds the body, behaviour and treatment of her pregnant self 
to be unfamiliar and in many cases, drastically different than that of her non-pregnant 
self, questions that have not been addressed in other contexts arise and demand response.  
Who is the pregnant woman?  Are her emotions or her behaviour included within the 
boundaries of what she considers to be her self?  How does the behaviour of others 
contribute to the formation of her self? Truly, the pregnant experience forces us to 





Throughout our consideration of the pregnant experience, we have encountered 
three main issues.  We have broached in varying degrees of detail the boundaries of the 
self, the possibility of a plural (be it compound or complex) self, and the diachronic 
identity of the self.  Through investigating these issues it has become clear that pregnancy 
throws into question many of the intuitive assumptions we typically make about the self.  
The questions that pregnancy poses are worth-while and legitimate and must be 
accounted for within a coherent theory of the self.  If we make assumptions about the self 
without considering the questions raised by the experience of pregnancy, we will have 
ignored a central and universal aspect of human experience that contributes significantly 
to this discussion. Pregnancy demands a theory of the self that goes beyond our common 





Chapter Four: The Application of Dennett to Pregnancy 
Introduction 
What Dennett Does 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Dennett claims that the self is a “centre of narrative 
gravity,” the main character of the story created through the team effort of a brain and the 
world.  Dennett explains: 
We…do not consciously and deliberately figure out what narratives to 
tell and how to tell them.  Our tales are spun, but for the most part we 
don’t spin them; they spin us.  Our human consciousness, and our 
narrative selfhood, is their product, not their source… this psychological 
or narrative self is yet another abstraction, not a thing in the brain. 
(1991, 418) 
 
As human beings we each construct a self, an abstract organizing principal around which 
everything else in our phenomenological world revolves.  The self is not a physical 
“thing in the brain,” or some other kind of material entity.  Nor is it a defined 
psychological entity made up of immaterial “soul-stuff.”  Because of this, there is no 
deeper truth about a particular self than how things seem to the subject. “Selves,” Dennett 
says, “are not independently existing soul-pearls, but artifacts of the social processes that 
create us (1991, 423)”.   
In coming to this conclusion, Dennett has undermined some common intuitions 
about the self.  He does this through a variety of tactics, supplementing argumentation 
with appeals to imagination.  He repeatedly considers the “philosophers’ favourites” like 
MPD, FPD, brain transplants and split-brain (1991, 420 – 424).  In considering these 
“much-discussed” conditions, we begin to question the relationship between the self and 




have two personalities or points of view, it may be reasonable to conclude that he has two 
selves, or at least a psychologically complex or even compound self.  If two people seem 
to be so closely linked that they seem to share a single self, Dennett claims that it may be 
easiest to treat them as such.  If my brain is in one place and my body in another, it may 
be most practical to see my self as independent from both.  Our usual assumptions about 
selves are undermined.  Because of the challenges they present to our intuitions, Dennett 
makes great use of these unique situations in reinforcing his often counter-intuitive 
claims.   
 
What Dennett Does not Do 
As we’ve already seen, pregnancy provides us with a different, though equally 
provocative, window into the nature of the self, this time from the perspective of ordinary 
life.  While Dennett cites many highly unusual and atypical cases where the 
circumstances surrounding selfhood are strange and out of the ordinary, he fails to take 
into account the experience of pregnancy – a typical, gendered and little-discussed issue 
in this literature.  Because of this, his theory misses an opportunity for generality and 
applicability.  Rothfield pinpoints the relevance of pregnancy: 
Its horizon of otherness within yields a movement beyond the self such that it 
is possible to experience a questioning: What is self and non-self?  What are 
the boundaries of the self?  What is inside and what is outside the self?  It is 
one thing to formulate these questions from a theoretical perspective, another 
to experience their complexity. (1996, 1) 
 
For the mainstream literature in analytic philosophy of mind to ignore this essential 
human experience when it offers so much in the way of understanding the self is a serious 




atypical.  Because Dennett considers these extraordinary disorders and not pregnancy, he 
runs the risk of presenting a theory of atypical cases, rather than a theory that applies 
generally to human experience.  Furthermore, his theory remains untested against 
pregnancy – an extremely common, intuition-challenging, human phenomenon.   
As we revisit the three main issues presented by pregnancy – boundaries, plurality 
and diachronic identity – we’ll see that the application of Dennett’s theory to pregnancy 
is mutually beneficial.  First, the evidence provided by the experiences of pregnant 
women reveals significant generality and applicability in Dennett’s theory of the self.  
Second, Dennett’s theory provides a structured context in which to understand and clarify 
women’s experiences of pregnancy. 
 
Ignoring Pregnancy: Hilary Putnam and J. J. Thomson 
While abnormal case studies have, and will continue to play a central role in our 
philosophical exploration of the self, pregnancy has remained unexplored.  In an effort to 
stretch and develop the outer limits of our philosophical theories and ideas, creativity has 
taken on an important role in the analytic tradition where philosophers rely on science-
fiction type thought experiments to test their hypotheses.  While thought experiments are 
valuable, the philosophical community has tended to focus on these extraordinary 
simulations, rather than a typical, common case like pregnancy.  This tendency is 
dangerous not only because we may be ignoring important data, but also because the 
idealized situations philosophers construct run the risk of idealizing away the very 




Hilary Putnam, in his paper “The Nature of Mental States” (1967), deliberately 
tries to avoid the problems associated with thought experiments by explicitly stating that 
his theory does not include a certain sci-fi character: the hive mind.  In his defence of the 
claim that pain is a functional state, Putnam states that an organism that is made up of 
pain-feeling beings cannot itself be a pain-feeling being (227).  The purpose of this 
stipulation is to rule out, for example, “swarms of bees as single pain-feelers” (227).  
While paying attention to the potential pitfalls of thought experiments is important, their 
predominance as a focal point within the philosophical community is problematic – even 
if the focus is on their dangers.  In Ned Block’s response to Putnam, in his paper 
“Troubles with Functionalism” (1980), he points out that this restriction on plural pain-
feelers eliminates pregnant women as pain-feeling organisms (279).  In an effort to 
accommodate his worries about imaginary sci-fi examples, Putnam rules out a reasonable 
theoretical description of the psychological aspects of pregnancy.  This is one example of 
a situation where too much attention has been paid to science-fiction hypothetical 
situations and not enough to the pregnant experience. 
One place where pregnancy has been a focus of philosophical discussion is in the 
context of abortion.  Judith Jarvis Thomson contributes significantly to this debate in her 
paper “A Defense of Abortion” (1971).  Whatever its philosophical virtues, for my 
purposes this widely-read and enormously influential paper is remarkable mainly for its 
complete failure to engage the universality and commonality of the pregnant experience. 
In a philosophical literature with a tendency to favour outlandish thought experiments 
over the common and familiar example of pregnancy, it is ironic that the most influential 




problem by depicting pregnancy itself in terms of bizarre and abnormal thought 
experiments.   
Thomson argues that even if “we grant that the fetus is a person from the moment 
of conception,” we will still “feel inclined to reject” the impermissibility of abortion 
(1971, 48).  She bases her argument primarily on a series of analogies, describing several 
imaginary situations intended to help us understand the moral significance of pregnancy.  
In her central, most well-known illustration, she asks you to imagine that “you wake up 
in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with…a famous unconscious 
violinist…[whose] circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can 
be used to extract poisons from his blood (1971, 48-49)”.  Later, however, Thomson also 
invites the reader  to imagine “yourself trapped in a tiny house with a …rapidly growing 
child – you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you’ll be 
crushed to death (1971, 52)”.  In both of these scenarios, your feelings as you imagine 
them (or recall childhood memories of  Adventures in Wonderland (1865)), are meant to 
approximate the feelings of pregnancy.   
As redolent of science-fiction or fairytale as these situations may seem, the most 
alarming is her comparison of pregnancy to the following scenario: 
People-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your 
windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery.  
You don’t want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh 
screens, the very best you can buy.  As can happen, however, and on 
very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; 
and a seed drifts in and takes root. (1971, 59) 
 
She goes on to ask whether or not, if this were to happen to you, the “person-plant” 




Regardless of whether one agrees with Thomson’s conclusions about abortion, 
and whatever one’s interpretation of the pregnant experience, it should be clear that 
Thomson’s depiction of pregnancy is far from realistic in at least one significant way.  It 
is hard to imagine a more unnatural and indeed creepy way for babies to come into the 
world than as floating “people-seeds” who grow up as plants from your living room 
carpet (as demonstrated in Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956)).  Even the legendary 
stork seems appealing by comparison.   
One might reasonably respond to Thomson that the thought experiment ends up 
not really being about fetuses – not even counterfactually or thought-experimentally.  In 
her construction of these extraordinary situations, she eliminates the very aspects of our 
intuitions which might be relevant to a meaningful response to the issue at hand.  Human 
fetuses and human babies come from humans, after all; creepy plant-babies are only the 
creepier for being so similar to actual babies.  It is not my aim to argue that Thomson’s 
position is mistaken overall, nor even that her argument fails.  Rather I aim to underscore 
the need not only for a greater focus on pregnancy in the moral and metaphysical analytic 
literature on persons, but for a more realistic focus on it as well.  We do not avoid the 
pitfalls of preferring thought experiments to critical human lived experiences if we treat 
those experiences in terms of sci-fi thought experiments when we do consider them.  
Thomson’s consideration of pregnancy does nothing to illuminate pregnancy as a central 
human experience that needs to be accounted for by the philosophical world.   
 




We have considered three main questions about the self that are highlighted in the 
context of pregnancy.  First, and most notably, pregnancy causes us to reconsider the 
boundaries of the self.   Whereas the skin is traditionally seen as the outer limit of “me” 
and everything outside of that is “not me,” through investigating the pregnant experience 
we have come to understand that drawing the boundary at the skin is unsatisfactory.  
Second, we have considered the possibility of a plural self.  Our traditional assumption 
that a self is a singular, unified entity is challenged by the presence of the fetus.  Lastly, 
we have explored the diachronic identity of the self.  The significant changes that take 
place during pregnancy cause us to question our assumption that we necessarily remain 
the same self throughout our lives.  The pre-pregnant self and the pregnant self seem in 
some cases to be two different selves.     
As we return to each of these three issues, we will move the discussion forward 
by applying Dennett’s theory of the self to the pregnant experience.  In doing so, we will 
demonstrate two things.  First, that the experiences of pregnant women substantiate and 
highlight the generality and applicability of Dennett’s theory of the self.  Second, 
Dennett’s theory of the self provides a valid and coherent context in which to understand 





Section One: Boundaries 
Dennett 
In Chapter Two, we explored how Dennett’s theory of the self leads to an 
understanding of the boundaries between self and other as fuzzy and flexible.  Through 
his discussion of the experience of your arm “falling asleep”, his story “Where Am I?” 
MPD and FPD, Dennett demonstrates that the self is not identical with the body.  Rather 
than viewing the self as a purely physical entity or a pearl of “soul-stuff,” Dennett 
concludes that the self is a centre of narrative gravity.  As we distinguished earlier, it is 
not the narrative that constitutes the self, but rather the content of the narrative, the main 
character.  It is not clear however, what is and is not to be included within the centre of 
narrative gravity.  If we were to take the self to be a physical entity, the skin would be a 
natural boundary line, and feelings of confusion and uncertainty in this area would be 
unfounded.  It is from within Dennett’s theory of the narrative self that concerns about 
the boundaries of the self, and thus the pregnant experience, find validation and 
justification. 
Dennett also considers the boundaries of the self in “The Reality of Selves” 
(1991).  Here he states that the distinction between the self and the other is crucial and yet 
nevertheless unclear.  There are certain things whose category we are sure about, such as 
brains, hearts, telephone poles and planets.  However, there are other things which are far 
less obvious: a wedding ring or a Blackberry for example.  When, without this object, we 
consciously notice its absence, we may begin to wonder whether or not we have 
expanded the boundaries of our self to include it.  Dennett accounts for this, stating that 




habits of creatures like spiders, beavers, crabs, and bowerbirds, highlighting how they all 
build up and extend the boundaries of their biological selves.  It isn’t just the skin, fur or 
feathers that draw the line.  There are objects, created and found, that play a role in the 
creation of the self and there is no clear way to delineate the end of the biological self and 
the beginning of the world. 
 
Pregnancy 
In pregnancy, the boundaries of the self are changing and unclear. Rothfield 
highlights the ambiguity of the self-other distinction within pregnancy: 
Any approach, which takes the skin to be the outer limits of a unitary, 
interior self, may not be able to incorporate the differences implied by 
pregnancy.  Is the growing fetus an element of another body or is it 
simply part of one's own body?  Perhaps pregnancy involves a mixing of 
selves, creating a hybrid and changing identity. (1996, 2) 
 
As we saw, many women consider the fetus to be other than themselves – a being 
separate from their being.  To have another individual within your own body crosses the 
traditional line between self and other.  There is now self and other within one body, and 
the boundaries of the woman’s self must shrink smaller than her skin.  On the other hand, 
a woman may not consider the fetus to be other.  Rather, because of the intimate 
closeness between her and the fetus, she may see the fetus as a part of her self.  In this 
case, the pregnant woman is seen as two-and-one, self and other.  This too confuses 
traditional boundaries, as there are two bodies included within the boundaries of one self.  
Pregnancy rules out theories of the self that demand rigid and static boundaries, thus 





Dennett’s Theory Works for the Pregnant Experience 
When we see the self as a centre of narrative gravity, an abstract organizing 
principal, we see that its boundaries are fuzzy and flexible.  From this perspective we 
begin to understand the challenges that pregnancy presents.  Because the self is not seen 
as identical with the body, it is possible to adjust its boundaries and view the fetus as self, 
other, or both.  Statements like, “I don’t know where I end and you begin,” which seem 
confused when we insist that there must be a definitive line, become, though no less 
complex, coherent and legitimate.  Dennett’s theory of the narrative self provides a fitting 
context in which to understand the challenges of the pregnant experience. 
 
The Pregnant Experience Works for Dennett’s Theory 
In Dennett’s discussion of the boundaries of the self, he gives a wide range of 
examples.  Common experiences such as your arm falling asleep or feeling like 
something you said yesterday wasn’t really you, do help us get a glimpse of the shifting 
boundaries of the self.  His main emphasis, though, is on his story, “Where Am I?”, 
examples like the Chaplin twins, and individuals with MPD.  None of these examples are 
typical, or in some cases, even realistic. Pregnancy is an intuition-challenging 
phenomenon that is common and consistent and which fits well within Dennett’s theory.  
Because of this, it substantiates Dennett’s claims to a degree that his other examples do 
not.  Although not all women’s experiences of pregnancy are the same, and there is a 
wide range of perspectives taken on the self within these experiences, the common 
themes that run through them push us away from our usual assumptions about the self, 




The application of Dennett’s theory to the pregnant experience works to the 
benefit of both, refining the former and providing a theoretical framework to 
accommodate the latter.  Dennett’s theory is bolstered by the generality and applicability 
that pregnancy reveals, and women’s experiences of pregnancy find coherence and 





Section Two: Plurality  
A further aspect of the self that is challenged both by pregnancy and by Dennett is 
the possibility of its plurality.  Can there be multiple selves contained within one self?  
From a conventional perspective there is always one self per body, and that self is a 
unified, singular entity.  To claim that the self can be plural would be nonsense. 
 
Putnam and Block 
As we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Hilary Putnam expresses this 
perspective in his paper “The Nature of Mental States” (1967).  In an effort to avoid the 
problems associated with “swarms of bees as single pain-feelers,” he states that pain-
feelers cannot be made up of other pain-feelers (227). While Putnam is not specifically 
referring to selves here, we can extend the application of his theory to selves, assuming 
that this restriction on pain-feelers would rule out plural selves as well.  Block’s 
recognition of the fact that this restriction rules out pregnant women as pain-feeling 
organisms (279) is encouraging, and highlights the dangers of the widespread tendency to 
focus on thought experiments rather than pregnancy. 
We see here that pregnancy stands as a legitimate example to be used in the 
defence of a plural self.  Block could substantiate his criticism of Putnam’s restriction by 
expanding on the idea that pregnant women contain two sentient beings and the 
ramifications of that fact.  He does not, however, go beyond a cursory glance at the 
pregnant experience.  Like J. J. Thomson, he raises the issue of pregnancy but does not 
seriously consider the details and nuances involved.  Rather, he goes on to elaborate on a 




recreate our natural environment by flying around miniscule ships that act as elementary 
particles.  After living in this world for a few years, it comes to be that you are 
constituted of these microscopic creatures and their ships.  “Would you be any less 
capable of feeling pain…just because the matter of which you are composed 
contains…beings who themselves have a functional organization characteristic of 
sentient creatures?” Block asks; “I think not” (280).  While his reference to pregnancy is 
hopeful, Block focuses on an abstract thought experiment to make his point.  Pregnancy 
is left on the sidelines. 
 
Three Types of Plurality: Total, Proper and Improper  
As Block outlines his contention with Putnam’s statement against plural minds, he 
outlines three different types of plurality (279).  We will translate his language of pain-
feelers into the language of selves to suit our purposes, creating three categories of 
selfhood.  As we saw with our analogy between selves and sentences, the categorization 
of selves can be helpful despite its limitations – most notably, the fact that most particular 
cases of selves will not fall neatly into any one category. 
Using the structure of Putnam’s categories for minds, the first type of plural self 
consists of a single self that is divisible into parts where all of the parts are also selves.  
We’ll call this Total Plurality.  A single self that is divisible into parts where only non-
essential parts are selves, we’ll call Improper Plurality.  The third type is the case of a 
single self, which is divisible into parts where essential parts are also selves.  This we’ll 




  As an example of Total Plurality, consider again MPD.  MPD can be understood 
as a case where there are two selves within one body.
10
  There is a single agent, with 
multiple associated selves, each with functional control at different times.  The various 
selves share a body, and seem to share psychological access and some properties, but also 
have independent characteristics and even memories.  This seems to be a case where the 
single self is divided into two or more parts, all of which are selves.   
For an example of Proper Plurality, consider Block’s example of the nation of 
China (1980, 276-277).  He proposes we imagine that the governing officials in China 
have been convinced to set up a system that will functionally replicate a mind.  
Individuals in the country are given a two-way radio, which connects them to each other 
as well as to an artificial body.  Instructions are broadcasted from satellites that everyone 
can see.  Block proposes that, even if only for one hour, the nation of China could 
replicate a human mind.  Moving again from the mind to the self, in this case, the single 
self would be divisible into parts, and some of those parts that are proper to it, are selves.  
The Chinese people are constitutive of the greater self; they each play an important role 
in the existence of the overall self.   
As an example of Improper Plurality, Block references pregnancy.  The fetus, he 
implies, is not a proper part of the pregnant woman, but rather a physical part of her, 
which also happens to be a self of some kind.  This does seem to be an intuitive 
interpretation of pregnancy.  The woman was a self before she became pregnant and will 
continue to be so after the baby is born.  However, our consideration of the effects of 
pregnancy on the self of the woman implies that the fetus may not be a completely 
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 In the language of our first categorization of plurality, this is an example of a bodily simple and 




inessential part of the pregnant woman.  The fetus can play a significant role in the re-
creation of the woman’s self as a pregnant self. 
These three categories of plurality, the Total, the Proper and the Improper, are 
helpful for understanding this aspect of the self, although the pregnant experience does 
not seem to fall neatly into any one of them. 
 
Pregnancy 
In pregnancy, the acceptance of some form of pluralism is necessary.  Here, we 
encounter more than one, but less than two selves, as parts of one self.  As we discussed, 
the status is not a full-fledged self, although it warrants consideration as a self in some 
sense, be it incomplete or dependent.  For the pregnant woman, Rothfield explains, “the 
need to incorporate the fetus' mass as one's own exists alongside the potential awareness 
of the fetus as an emergent and differentiated being (1996, 7)”.  The fetus is both self and 
other, where overlap and intersection replace boundaries and separation.  Pregnancy, 
Rothfield claims, disregards the Law of the Excluded Middle and is “an embodiment of 
the Law of the Included Middle” (1996, 8).  The pregnant woman is two-and-one.  She 
does not merely think of the fetus as a separate being within her body, but also as 
something that is a part of her.   
 
The Illusion of Unity 
Although Dennett does not consider the question of plurality directly, as we saw 
in Chapter Two he does consider the apparent unity of the self, and argue against it.  For 




virtual captain of the crew.”  These parts work together and “appear as if they were the 
executed intentions of a Conceptualizer,” Dennett explains, “– and indeed they are, but 
not of an inner Conceptualizer,” something inside the brain that tells the different 
specialists what to do, but rather the intentions of a “global Conceptualizer, the person” 
(1991, 251). The person is made up of the specialists, the brain, and the body – the 
system as a whole.   The self arises from “an ultimately mechanical fabric of semi-
independent semi-intelligences acting in concert (Dennett, 1991, 251)”.  Here we see the 
beginnings of an acceptance of a plural self. 
In Dennett’s discussion of the illusion of a unified self, he considers the Chinese 
Room argument.  Presented by John Searle (1980), this thought experiment, designed to 
demonstrate that a machine which simply follows a set of rules is not intelligent, rests on, 
among other things, the intuition that minds are singular and not plural.  Searle asks us to 
imagine a room in which all of the rules of the Chinese language are available.  In one 
window of the room come sets of meaningless symbols, in response to which a person in 
the room is to send out the corresponding meaningless symbols.  Imagining that this 
process of inputs and outputs could take place at the rate of normal conversation, Searle 
asks whether or not the person in the room could be said to understand Chinese.  For 
Searle, the obvious response is no.  Dennett, however, argues that “Searle, laboring in the 
Chinese Room, does not understand Chinese, but he is not alone in the room.  There is 
also the System, CR [Chinese Room], and it is to that self that we should attribute any 
understanding (1991, 439)”.  Again, the self is not the system manager, overseeing its 
activities, but rather, it is a result of the system as a whole.  This too lends itself to the 




the skin.  On Dennett’s view, the Chinese Room contains one self bounded by skin – but 
another bounded by the walls. 
 
Social Creations 
Dennett’s discussion of the social factors that contribute to the creation of a self 
continues to lead us in the direction of a plural self.  In his discussion of the biological 
selves of animals he states that they may “extend beyond the ‘natural’ boundary of the 
individuals” to include other individuals of the same species (1991, 415).  His 
characterization of human selves as “artifacts of the social processes that create us” 
presents us with reason to believe that the creation of the self is significantly affected by 
other selves – the other characters in the narrative (1991, 423).  In a discussion of how we 
treat the bodies of the deceased, Dennett comments on the important role that individuals 
play in the creation of others’ selves: “that corpse is the body of dear old Jones, a Center 
of Narrative Gravity that owes its reality as much to our collaborative efforts of mutual 
heterophenomenological interpretation as to the body that is now lifeless (1991, 452)”.   
It is at least consistent, therefore, within Dennett’s theory, to assume that the self 
could be plural - divisible into parts which are also selves.  It does not seem unreasonable 
to move from a disunified conglomeration of “semi-intelligences” to a plural self.  And 
thus, we see again how Dennett’s theory helps to make sense of the pregnant experience.  
For the pregnant woman who sees her fetus as a part of her, the narrative self makes 
sense.  If other human beings can play a role in the creation of her self, that role can be 
extended to the fetus as well.  The connection between the fetus and the woman is 




to play a significant role within the self of the pregnant woman is enormous.  The fetus is 
not only a contributor to the self of the pregnant woman, like other human beings in her 
life, but in fact a part of it.   
The social aspect of the self in Dennett’s theory fits with pregnant experience in 
another way as well.  As we considered the new and different self that pregnant women 
experience because of their unfamiliar bodies and behaviour, we noted that the treatment 
of the pregnant woman by others also contributes significantly to the creation of the 
pregnant self.  The unwritten rules of social interaction are altered when a woman is 
pregnant as is her consideration under the law.  Dennett’s theory makes sense of this 
transformation through his understanding of the role that social interaction plays in the 
creation of the self.   
As we did in our consideration of the boundaries of the self, we have seen here 
that the application of Dennett’s theory to pregnancy has been fruitful in its resulting 
clarification and validation of the pregnant experience.  Similarly, we see again that, 
despite its hitherto unrecognized value, pregnancy does provide legitimate grounds for 
questioning the necessary unity of the self.  Because of this, and its universal nature, the 
pregnant experience substantiates Dennett’s theory, and particularly his claim that the self 





Section Three: Diachronic Identity 
Differentiating Between One Self and Another 
A final issue that is highlighted by both pregnancy and Dennett is the diachronic 
identity of the self.  Dennett considers this possibility when he asks a classic question: 
“Are the adventures of that child, whose trajectory through space and time has apparently 
been continuous with the trajectory of your body, your very own adventures? (1991, 
423)”.  He discusses Parfit’s comparison of a person to a club “which might go out of 
existence one year, and come to be reconstituted…some years later” (1991, 423).  He 
goes on to explore the criteria for distinguishing one self from another by considering the 
synchronic identity of the self in the case of split-brain patients.  He discusses how the 
split-brain subject seems to have been split into two different selves – one for each side of 
the brain.  Dennett discounts this idea however, claiming that the two sides of the brain 
are not two different selves because their stories are not sufficiently distinct.  “The 
conditions for accumulating the sort of narrative richness (and independence) that 
constitutes a ‘fully fledged’ self are not present”, he argues (1991, 426). He states, 
therefore, “the distinctness of different narratives is the life-blood of different selves 
(1991, 425)”.  Unless two narratives are sufficiently different, they should be considered 
the same self.  This consideration of synchronic identity helps us to understand Dennett’s 
views on diachronic identity as well.  The same criterion that Dennett uses for 
differentiating between selves at a single point in time can be applied to selves across 
time as well. 
Dennett illustrates this criterion again with his consideration of the Chaplin twins.  




were never apart.  There seemed to be one self shared between two bodies (1991, 422).  
In this case Dennett asks, “what if each of these women had become so selfless (as we do 
say) in her devotion to the cause, that she more or less lost herself (as we also say) in the 
project (1991, 423)”. Having been together almost constantly throughout their lives, these 
women seem to lack two distinct narratives, and thus, he claims, it may be reasonable to 
assign them one self.  We can see how easily Dennett’s theory maps on to the 
experiences of pregnancy in this excerpt about being “selfless” and “losing” one’s self.  
In many cases it seems we could say the same thing as Dennett has said here about the 
Chaplin twins, about a pregnant woman or a mother. 
 
Different Narratives, Different Selves 
Dennett’s claim that it may be “reasonable” to assign one or two selves in a given 
situation can be understood as “practical”.  A self is no more than an abstract organizing 
principal; it is a theoretical entity that we use to make sense of the behaviour of complex 
systems such as other human beings, and ourselves.  Thus, in determining whether or not 
to assign one self or two, the decision is based on simplifying explanations and 
predictions about the system.  For example, 
When a human being’s behavioural control system becomes seriously 
impaired, it can turn out that the best hermeneutical story we can tell 
about that individual says that there is more than one character 
“inhabiting” that body…all that has to be the case is that the story 
doesn’t cohere around one self, one imaginary point, but coheres 
(coheres much better, in any case) around two different imaginary points 





In the case of the Chaplin twins, they seem to share a life so completely that their 
narratives are nearly identical, and so it is easier to consider them one self than two 
(1991, 422). 
 
Pregnancy Stimulates the Creation of a Different Narrative 
In our exploration of the dramatic changes that take place for a pregnant woman 
we have seen that the continuation of the self through time is not an assumption that can 
be taken for granted.  As a woman processes the extreme changes may be taking place 
during her pregnancy, she may see her pre-pregnant self as being replaced by a new and 
different self.  Her body may change and become unfamiliar in its appearance and 
phenomenology.  Her behaviour may change as she is affected by shifting hormones and 
shifting social roles, moving from professional to stay-at home, independent to 
interdependent, couple to family.  The way she is treated both formally and informally 
may be altered. The story of her life changes; everything around her indicates that she is a 
different person with a different occupation, appearance, personality, and character – a 
different self.   
 
Pregnancy Works for Dennett 
In his discussion of the distinctness of different selves, Dennett considers the 
cases of split-brain patients and the Chaplin twins.  While they do achieve Dennett’s goal 
of causing his readers to rethink their assumptions about the self, these cases are atypical 
and difficult to relate to. Pregnancy, on the other hand, is common and familiar.  It 




case studies cannot.  The application of Dennett’s theory to pregnancy illustrates that this 
essential human experience serves to effectively anchor his claims in everyday reality, 
adding generality and applicability that was previously lacking. 
 
Dennett Works for the Pregnant Experience 
Not only does the application of Dennett’s theory to pregnancy work for the 
benefit of Dennett’s theory, but again, it is for the advantage of the pregnant experience 
as well.  When we use Dennett’s theory to structure women’s experiences of an 
unfamiliar body, behaviour, treatment and ultimately, self, these phenomena find a place 
within a context that is coherent and rational.   
If we assume that there is only one self per body per lifetime, experiences of 
transformation from an old self to a new self seem ridiculous and unreasonable.  As 
Dennett considers the process of re-thinking and reinterpreting one’s past, he comments, 
“this process does change the ‘fictional’ character, the character that you are…This 
would be an utterly mysterious and magical prospect (and hence something no one 
should take seriously) if the self were anything but an abstractum (1986, 110)”.  When 
we view the self as a centre of narrative gravity, the possibility of becoming a different 
self over time becomes a real possibility, and the pregnant experience is seen as 
something we should take seriously.  When we apply the criterion that Dennett uses to 
distinguish between two selves synchronically in the case of the diachronic identity of the 
pre-pregnant, and the pregnant self, we can see that the narrative of the pregnant 





The new self of the pregnant woman is also clarified when we consider Dennett’s 
Multiple Drafts Model.  Through this we see the self as being continuously recreated.   
As the different parts of the brain work together to create the narratives that revolve 
around the self, they are constantly editing and revising incoming stimuli.  A major 
change in sensory input, as in pregnancy, could stimulate the creation of a distinct set of 
narratives and thus, a different self.  In addition to there being another being inside her, 
changes in the shape and size of her body, as well as massive hormonal shifts could all 
contribute the creation of a different self.  Raphael-Leff illuminates the extreme changes 
that take place: 
While gestating her baby, a woman’s freedom of choice is curtailed.  For 
the duration of the pregnancy she must share her body with another who is 
always there, even in her most private moments; who interrupts her 
thoughts and disturbs her sleep, forces her to change her eating, working 
and toilet habits, and alters activity patterns of a lifetime. (Raphael-Leff, 
1993, 15) 
 
Clearly these significant changes, both internal and external, all contribute to major 
alterations in the narrative and its main character.  The diachronic identity of the self can 
be broken during pregnancy. 
For a woman to experience a different self during pregnancy makes sense in the 
context of a narrative self.  Dennett’s theory brings clarity and validity to the experience 
of pregnancy, helping to make sense of the challenges it presents to our traditional 
assumptions about the self.  Indeed, by applying Dennett’s theory to pregnancy within the 
context of the diachronic identity of the self we see that each one works well to support 






Throughout Chapters Two and Three we have highlighted two main problems: 
First, Dennett lacks the evidence from typical life necessary to arrive at a general and 
applicable theory.  Second, because the experience of pregnancy challenges our 
traditional assumptions about the self, it demands a theory of the self that can effectively 
account for it by moving beyond our ordinary intuitions.  When we apply Dennett’s 
theory to the pregnant experience, both of these needs are met: the pregnant experience is 
accounted for by a coherent theory of the self – a fitting context in which it can be 
understood and validated – and Dennett is able to take advantage of the intuition-
challenging data that pregnancy provides, thus substantiating his theory significantly.  
Through our consideration of the boundaries, plurality and diachronic identity of the self, 
we have seen that the application of Dennett’s theory of the self to the pregnant 




Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Section One: Where We’ve Been 
The application of Dennett’s theory of the self to pregnancy yielded a double 
result.  We saw that Dennett’s theory was supported by pregnancy, a typical, gendered, 
little discussed phenomenon, which served to add generality and applicability to his 
theory.  At the same time, pregnancy was placed within a context where it could be better 
understood and validated.  Before we were able to come to these conclusions, we spent 
some time investigating both Dennett’s theory of the self, and the pregnant experience.   
In Chapter One we were able to get a more general understanding of the two 
problems that prompted the application of Dennett’s theory to pregnancy.  First, 
Dennett’s theory does not demonstrate generality and applicability, as his examples are 
highly unusual and extraordinary.  Second, women’s experiences of pregnancy present a 
significant challenge our common intuitions about the self.  They necessitate a theory of 
the self that does not merely uphold our usual assumptions. 
Four approaches that work against our usual assumptions are those of Chalmers 
and Clark, Strauss, Parfit and Kittay.  These thinkers challenge our assumptions about the 
self, demonstrating that with some work, our foundational ideas can be reconstructed.  
Dennett’s theory of the self demonstrates this as well; we considered it in Chapter Two. 
To begin, we considered the problem of objectivity and subjective experience.  As 
Dennett explains, we are trapped within our own perspective and thus, to gain an 
objective perspective on any subjective experience is difficult, since there will always be 




In response to this problem, Dennett presents heterophenomenology and the 
Intentional Stance.  Through these two approaches, we can understand an individual’s 
subjective experience objectively and view her as a rational agent.  To add a level of 
complexity to this understanding, Dennett compares interpreting the text of the subject to 
interpreting a fictional text.   
In the final section of Chapter Two we finally encountered a full statement of 
Dennett’s theory of the self.  For Dennett, the self is a centre of narrative gravity.  It is a 
theoretical, abstract object, which is useful for predicting and explaining the behaviour of 
human beings – others and ourselves.  The self, though fictional, is that around which 
everything in the life of the subject revolves.  This understanding of the self as a centre of 
narrative gravity challenges many of our intuitions about the self.  Assumptions about the 
boundaries of the self, the relationship between the body and the self as well as the unity 
of the self are all disputed by Dennett’s theory.   
Dennett’s theory makes use primarily of hypothetical situations and examples 
drawn from the extraordinary circumstances that nature presents.  He fails to take into 
account the central human experience of pregnancy, which, though common, challenges 
our intuitions as well.  We explored this further in Chapter Three. 
We saw in Chapter Three how pregnancy causes us to question many of the 
assumptions we hold about the self.  We considered the boundaries, plurality and 
diachronic identity of the self, illustrating how the exploration of the pregnant experience 
pushes us to reconsider our intuitions about these issues. 
During pregnancy the boundaries between the two are unclear.  The boundary of 




pregnancy. This was demonstrated through our consideration of the view of the fetus as 
other, as well as the connection between the fetus and the pregnant woman.   
The second issue we considered was plurality.  Some pregnant women see the 
fetus as a part of the self, and in this way she becomes two-and-one.  Our comparison 
between the self and the sentence yielded three categories of plural selves: the simple, the 
compound and the complex, resulting in nine possible cases when we applied these 
categories to selves both bodily and psychologically. 
The break between pre-pregnant and pregnant experience was the emphasis of our 
final section considering the diachronic identity of the self.  In pregnancy, many women 
encounter a self that is new and unfamiliar.  The body, behaviour and treatment of the 
pregnant woman seem unfamiliar to her, pushing her towards the identification of a new 
self.   
In Chapter Four we tackled the main task of this project: the application of 
Dennett’s theory of the narrative self to the pregnant experience.  We considered this 
throughout the three main areas of our discussion: boundaries, plurality and diachronic 
identity.  In each we looked at the application of Dennett’s narrative self to pregnancy, 
noting that it is beneficial in two ways.  The evidence provided by the pregnant 
experience is accounted for by a coherent theory of the self where it is validated and 
contextualized.  Also, Dennett’s theory is substantiated and generalized by applying it to 
the experience of pregnancy. 
In our consideration of a plural self, we highlighted three possible types of plural 




nation of China were clear examples of Total and Proper Plurality, it is not clear that 




Section Two: Where We’re Going 
As I have emphasized repeatedly throughout this paper, pregnancy is a largely 
unexplored area within philosophy.  There is thus much work to be done in continuing 
the research and exploration that I have started here.  I will briefly discuss four topics of 
consideration, though many more still remain to be engaged by philosophers.  I propose 
that the medicalization of pregnancy, the relationship between the body and the self 
within pregnancy, the connected self, and finally, the fetus as a dependent self are all 
worthwhile subjects for further exploration and development. 
 
The Medicalization of Pregnancy 
 
The pregnant experience pushes us to look for the extraordinary within the 
ordinary.  A process that has been encountered throughout human history and beyond, 
pregnancy is a central part of the life of every mammal on earth.  As such, it may be easy 
to brush it aside – it is so common that we may assume the research as been done and the 
books have been written.  As is often the case however, this common occurrence in fact 
remains mysterious and relatively untouched by scholarly study.  One explanation for this 
philosophical neglect might be found in the medicalization of pregnancy.  This is the 
process through which pregnancy has come to be seen as a medical situation in need of 
hospitalization and professional care, rather than as a normal human experience.  The 
benefits of this transition are obvious, as the safety and predictability of the process 
continue to increase.  The disadvantages are not as easy to see, but are nevertheless 
significant and worth serious consideration.  Using Dennett’s heterophenomenological 




narrative self, their experiences within the medical system can be more effectively 
understood. 
As medical institutions have assumed the care of pregnant women and the 
birthing process, the professional has come to be seen as the ultimate authority; most 
others are left to watch from the sidelines – including the pregnant woman. “The ‘iron 
curtain’ of the mother has been swept aside revealing the womb and its contents in their 
full glory; it has become no longer necessary to consult mothers about their attitudes 
(Oakley, 1984, 183)”.  Technological tools enable medical professionals to treat patients 
as bodies rather than as whole persons, regardless of their condition. The fact that 
normally all pregnant patients are women compounds this problem. 
Vangie Bergum depicts the neglect of the pregnant woman through her 
understanding of “the baby in the machine,” constructed by the devices that monitor the 
well being of the fetus.  “While dramatic, and reassuring of the baby’s liveliness, the 
baby in the machine changes the focus of everyone, even the mother (1989, 144)”.  The 
lived experience of the pregnant or birthing woman is no longer an important component 
of understanding her pregnancy as the machines depict the behaviour of the woman’s 
interior as well as the fetus.  Wolf describes her experience with her OB-GYN during a 
pelvic exam, noting, “His focus on me (or should I say, ‘me’, since his attention seemed 
focused on an interchangeable ‘it’) was entirely waist-down (2001, 16)”.   
Although scientific advances in this area have undoubtedly made birth and 
pregnancy both safer and more predictable, the role of the pregnant woman has become 
secondary.  “As the risks encountered by women in childbearing became less in the 




containers of fetuses (Oakley, 1984, 253)”.  The pregnant woman’s experiences are not 
seen as a reliable source for understanding the progress and state of her pregnancy.  
Technology and professionals have taken her place, rather than augmented her accounts.  
By the end of her pregnancy, “it almost feels that a woman no longer owns her body…the 
woman merely goes along ‘unneeded by Nature’s work’ (Chesler, 1979, 65)”.  Bergum 
depicts this phenomenon, specifically during the birth: 
…she would have nothing to say because there would no longer be any 
words to describe her sensation of painful contractions.  In such a 
situation others could direct and control her labor, telling her when her 
contractions are starting and finishing.  She would not experience her 
baby inside but rather as a separate being who is delivered through the 
coordinated efforts of others.  She would just be the vehicle of the 
child’s passage into the world where he or she will be kept warm, 
measured, and tested.  It would be hard to tell the difference between the 
woman and the machine because they would all act machine-like with 
wires and electrodes attaching themselves together. (1989, 147) 
 
The medicalization of pregnancy has created an atmosphere where the pregnant 
woman is not an authoritative source for understanding her own experience.  Although 
Dennett’s approach to subjective experience confirms this, that the individual is not the 
authority on what’s really happening, the heterophenomenological method validates the 
reports of the subject as a reliable description of her phenomenological world.  Although 
technological advances connect the doctor to the interior of the womb, the closest 
connection to the fetus is through the pregnant woman herself, and her experiences 
provide valuable information about the pregnancy.  A clear understanding of “what it’s 
like” for the pregnant woman can be achieved and should be considered. With our 
consideration here of the pregnant self as another step in the right direction, I hope we 





The Body and the Self 
Pregnancy seems to point to a major rift between the body and the self.  Many 
women feel that the pregnant body is foreign and unfamiliar and may consider it other, 
rather than self.  The complexity of the relationship reveals itself through the significant 
role that the body does play in the formation of the pregnant self.  Its internal hormonal 
shifts and changes in external appearance cause changes in the pregnant woman’s 
behaviour and treatment, moving her towards the formation of a new self.  Using 
Dennett’s theory of the narrative self as a lens through which to view women’s 
experiences, it would be a productive investigation to look into the nature of the 
relationship between the body and the self during pregnancy. 
Pregnant women’s experiences of self and body push us to reconsider, for 
example, Dennett’s thought experiment “Where Am I?”  When Dennett’s body is 
destroyed and his brain is attached to a new body, he comments, 
When I looked into the mirror, though, I was a bit startled to see an 
unfamiliar face…As many philosophers unfamiliar with my ordeal have 
more recently speculated, the acquisition of a new body leaves one’s 
person intact.  And after a period of adjustment…one’s personality is by 
and large also preserved…the view in the mirror soon became utterly 
familiar. (Dennett, 1981, 225) 
 
Although Dennett admits that the new face in the mirror was startling, he claims that it 
“soon” lost its novelty and he was able accommodate it quickly.  While Dennett imagines 
that this would be the case, should one find oneself suddenly in a new body, pregnancy 
suggests that it would not.  Women’s experiences of pregnancy indicate that the 
discovery of a new and unfamiliar body may not leave the person in tact as Dennett 




Dennett’s thought experiment does differ from pregnancy in interesting ways.  In 
the thought experiment the transition to a new body was sudden and complete, whereas 
the pregnant woman experiences more of a wave of change; the shift from old to new 
begins slowly with conception, peaks just before the baby is born.  This transformation 
may dissipate gradually after the baby is born, but the post-pregnant woman may never 
return to her pre-pregnant self.  As the pregnant woman begins to accommodate herself to 
her new body, it continues to change, leaving her without an opportunity to completely 
adapt and view it as familiar.  Nevertheless, our intuitions about the adaptability of the 
self may need consideration in light of this experience.  Perhaps the self would not stay 
the same should it be relocated to a new body.  Differences in appearance, ability, 
appetite, preferences and more would all accompany a new body, affecting the self that 
belongs to it. These and other questions regarding the role of the body in the formation of 
the self should be explored in light of the pregnant experience. 
 
The Connected Self 
A further exploration that may fall out of this project is a more detailed 
reconsideration of women’s experiences in general from the perspective of the narrative 
self.  Having found a conceptualization of the self that makes sense of the pregnant 
experience, perhaps other types of women’s experiences can be contextualized here as 
well.  One area in particular that would seem suited to this purpose is the relational aspect 
of many women’s experiences.  The narrative self allows for an understanding of the self 
as connected and interdependent – characteristics with which women may struggle in a 




children play a significant role in the definition of the self.  When her children leave the 
house, a mother may feel that she must rebuild her self:  
The housewife in her mid-forties may jokingly say “I feel like someone 
out of a job.”  But in the eyes of society, once having been mothers, 
what are we, if not always mothers? …it is not enough to let our children 
go; we need selves of our own to return to. (Rich, 1976, 37) 
 
As Carol Gilligan explains, a woman’s sense of self may become  
[V]ery much organized around being able to make, and then to maintain, 
affiliations and relationships…for many women, the threat of disruption 
of an affiliation is perceived not just as a loss of a relationship but as 
something closer to a total loss of self. (Gilligan, 1982, 169).   
 
From within a traditional conception of the self as an independent, internal 
“boss”, these experiences do not make sense.  To take a perspective in which one 
“conceptualizes the self as basically connected to others” requires an alternate 
understanding of the self (Belenky et al., 1986, 178).   This perspective makes more sense 
from within the theory of the narrative self.  Understanding selves in this way allows not 
only for the pregnant woman to see the fetus as a part of her self, but also for other 
women to see those they are connected to in a similar way.   
We may find that the experiences of women, not only when pregnant, but also in 
other situations are better understood and validated when considered from the perspective 
of the narrative self.  Further investigation into the application of Dennett’s theory of the 
self to the experiences of women would be a fruitful project. 
 
The Fetus as a Dependent Self 
A final direction in which to take this application of Dennett to pregnancy would 




of Chapter Four we briefly mentioned Dennett’s view that selves owe their existence “as 
much to our collaborative efforts of mutual heterophenomenological interpretation as to 
the body that is now lifeless” (1991, 452), a view that emphasizes the nature of the self as 
a social creation.  Dennett also talks about the immortality of selves, claiming that “your 
existence depends on the persistence of that narrative,” which means “theoretically” that 
you could “survive the death of your body as intact as a program can survive the 
destruction of the computer on which it was created and first run” (1991, 430).   
These comments about the role that a community plays in the construction of the 
self, and especially about the persistence of some form of self after the disappearance of 
the thinking, speaking, interacting self, suggest extending the self in the other direction.  
Perhaps some form of self can exist before the appearance of the thinking, speaking, 
interacting self, just as a computer program may exist before the computer on which it is 
first run is constructed.  It is difficult to see the fetus as a self because it lacks so many of 
the hallmarks that we typically associate with selves.  However, through Dennett’s theory 
of the narrative self it may be reasonable to assign the fetus (and perhaps even the 
infant/baby/non-lingual child) a self that is constructed primarily by those that interact 
with it, and for whom the fetus is a significant being.  When we think of it this way, the 
depiction that we have used of the fetus as a dependent self makes even more sense, as 
the incomplete self of the fetus does in fact literally depend, for its existence, to a large 
degree on the pregnant woman (as she plays a significant role in the determination of its 
narrative), and to a lesser degree on the other individuals that contribute to it.  Further 
thought and investigation in this direction would certainly be productive.  A further 




dependent self, as a pet, for example, may play a significant role in the life of a family, 
thus developing a potentially unique and complex narrative of its own.  
 In philosophy we take the beaten path and, rather than rushing carelessly over its 
bridges, tunnels and turns, we examine it slowly and carefully, leaving no stone unturned, 
regardless of how familiar and well-used it may seem to be.  Pregnancy, a well-beaten 
path taken by women throughout the world and throughout history, has remained 
unexplored.  As we have seen here, it warrants thorough and significant consideration 
within the philosophical literature as it challenges many of our common intuitions, 
particularly about the nature of the self.  One approach through which these challenges 
can be met is the application of Daniel Dennett’s theory of the narrative self to the 
pregnant experience.  This application yields a double result where the pregnant 
experience is illuminated and validated within a coherent and fitting context and where 
Dennett’s theory of the self is bolstered by a demonstration of its generality and 
applicability.  In this final chapter we have seen that this application has potential 
benefits that go even beyond the pregnant experience, including a greater understanding 
of the relationship between the body and the self, of the connected self and of the fetus as 
a dependent self.  Through continued research in these areas, the beaten paths of the mind 
can be cleared and illuminated and the familiar obstacles along them can be revealed and 
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